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FLIGHT ATTENDANT FURIES: IS TITLE VII




THE HIRING practices for airline flight attendants have
changed dramatically over the past twenty years.' Air-
lines have modified or abandoned standards based on sex,
age, weight, and appearance for numerous reasons.
Flight attendants, women's groups, and unions first op-
posed airline policies on these standards in the early
1970's. Flight attendants, individually and through un-
ions, filed lawsuits alleging discriminatory hiring stan-
dards. Many of these early challenges were successful
because of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 3
Despite the claims of victory from flight attendant
groups and unions, it was not clear whether the courts ac-
tually adopted the line of reasoning espoused by those
groups for the past two decades. The claims of victory
were tainted in various ways. First, settlements became
more prevalent since neither the unions nor the airlines
See THOMAS M. ASHWOOD, THIS Is YOUR CAPTAIN SPEAKING: A HANDBOOK FOR
AIR TRAVELERS 99-103 (1974) (discussing the early development of hiring prac-
tices and appearance standards); Franklin A. Nachman, Hiring, Firing, and Retiring."
Recent Developments in Airline Labor and Employment Law, 53J. AIR L. & CoM. 31, 51-
56 (1987)(discussing the development of hiring standards and their subsequent
discontinuation).
2 PAULA KANE & CHRISTOPHER CHANDLER, SEX OBJECTS IN THE SKY 84 (1974).
Various groups of stewardesses organized and filed lawsuits against the airlines
charging discrimination against women in hiring practices and promotional op-
portunities. Id.
:1 Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1988).
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wanted to endure the time and expense of prolonged liti-
gation. Moreover, the airlines were eager to avoid the
negative publicity of such lawsuits. Second, courts repeat-
edly denied relief on certain claims brought under Title
VII and were reluctant to either expand the traditional in-
terpretation of Title VII or apply other legislation to these
claims.
Therefore, the sides compromised with settlements in
which the airlines admitted neither liability nor discrimi-
nation in hiring practices.4 Furthermore, the airlines have
been successful in maintaining some sort of minimum
standards for hiring that inevitably involve appearance.
These so-called "grooming standards" survived because
they fell outside the statutory protections of Title VII.
In fact, the true Title VII challenges came early in the
history of airline policies regarding sex, age, weight and
appearance. Using the sex category of Title VII, however,
does not easily extend that far, as this comment will
demonstrate.
Part II of this Comment traces the historical develop-
ment of the commercial airlines' use of flight attendants,
including an overview of the hiring standards for flight at-
tendants and the justifications for such standards. Part III
examines the enactment of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 and its impact on the airlines, focusing in par-
ticular on the historical changes based on sex. Part IV
analyzes the mixed success of current challenges based on
weight, age, and appearance. Part V considers the latest
analysis that the courts have used and assesses the poten-
tial future success of challenges.
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
The use of commercial aircraft increased dramatically
See, e.g., McLoughlin v. American Airlines, Inc., No. 74C 1271/J (E.D.N.Y.
Dec. 19, 1977)(Settlements of Class Action); Association of Professional Flight




following World War II.' Thirteen million passengers
flew on commercial flights in 1946, an increase of 2500
percent in twenty years.6 Although the general strategy of
selling air travel developed in the 1920's, air travel was
essentially limited to businessmen and the wealthy.7 The
advancements in the cost-efficiency, size, and speed of air-
craft helped air travel grow into mass transportation.8 As
demand grew and competition increased, the airlines
started to compete with the ultimate sales pitch: the stew-
ardess.9 Although various airlines had used stewardesses
since the 1930's, the role and perception of the steward-
ess changed following World War II.
The first flight attendant flew on Boeing Air Transport,
a predecessor of United Air Lines, on May 15, 1930.'0
The company planned to hire stewards to help passengers
during the flights but as an experiment hired a young wo-
man instead." That young woman and the ones who fol-
lowed thus became stewardesses. The first stewardesses
employed by the airlines were registered nurses, chosen
not only because they were able to treat illnesses on board
but also because they were institutionally trained and ac-
customed to discipline.' 2
Other airlines followed by hiring female nurses as well.
What began as the experimental use of women for serving
sandwiches and refreshments on commercial aircraft led
to the current socialization that the job of flight attendant
was for women only.' 3 Although airline management was
pleased with the use of stewardesses, all of the parties in-
KENNETH HUDSON, AIR TRAVEL: A SOCIAL HISTORY 119 (1972).
ASHWOOD, supra note 1, at 98.
HUDSON, supra note 5, at 73.
"Id. at 119.
ASHWOOD, supra note 1, at 98.
Id.
KANE & CHANDLER, supra note 2, at 97-98.
12 ASHWOOD, supra note 1, at 99.
1:1 See Nadine Taub, Keeping Women in Their Place: Sterotyping Per Se as a Form of
Employment Discrimination, 21 B.C. L. REV. 345, 349 (1980); Pamela Whitesides,
Flight Attendant Weight Policies: A Title III Wrong Without a Renedy, 64 S. CAL. L. REV.
175, 188 (1990).
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volved did not share the excitement. At first, the women
met only opposition. One of the first stewardesses said
that the pilots did not want them on the planes at all, and
the wives of the pilots were equally unhappy about the
idea. 4 Nevertheless, the airlines eventually respected the
nurses as professionals and important members of the
crew. 15
Later developments changed not only the hiring re-
quirements for stewardesses but also the perception of
them as parts of the flight crew. World War II caused a
shortage of nurses, and the airlines were forced to drop
the nursing requirement for hiring.' 6 Moreover, soldiers
returning from World War II indirectly brought another
change in hiring practices. Thousands of soldiers re-
turned from the Far East after having experienced the
obedience and femininity of the Asian women.' 7 Accord-
ing to studies, the soldiers looked for the "ultimate femi-
ninity", and that trait became a commodity for selling
goods." Also, increasing competition between the air-
lines forced the airlines to look for ways to attract custom-
ers. As a result of these factors, the airlines created and
combatted the increased competition with a "new and im-
proved" stewardess.
The new trend forced stewardesses to be young, beauti-
ful, and single in order to attract the predominantly male
customers.' 9 The stewardess, as the ultimate sales pitch,
had to be the ultimate woman. Many airlines required
that flight attendants be women under 25 years of age,
under 115 pounds, and under 5 feet 4 inches. 20 The stew-
ardess became the image of the industry and the lure for
air traveling businessmen.
According to studies of the industry, all of the airlines
11 HUDSON, supra note 5, at 46.
Id. at 47.
KANE & CHANDLER, supra note 2, at 102.
'7 Whitesides, supra note 13, at 182.
ASHWOOD, supra note 1, at 97-98.
KANE & CHANDLER, supra note 2, at 102.
- ASHWOOD, supra note 1, at 99.
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moved toward what commentators have called the "sex
object" criteria for hiring flight attendants. 2' The airlines
continued to enforce the earlier age, weight, and height
standards. Additionally, they imposed strict standards of
appearance and grooming for flight attendants. 22 For ex-
ample, girdles were required and glasses forbidden.2 3
Some airlines required all flight attendants to wear only
one shade of lipstick such as TWA red.24 Critics have as-
serted that the flying "playboy experience" and the "Hef-
ner-esque" atmosphere was the model for the industry.2 5
The airlines created entire marketing campaigns
around the new and ideal model of the flight attendant.
For example, Braniff International advertised the "end of
the plain plane" slogan accompanied by new exotic flight
attendant wardrobes.2 6 The airlines competed to have the
flashiest costumes and sexiest slogans. 27 Continental in-
troduced the "We really move our tails for you" cam-
paign, and Southwest Airlines served "love potions" and
"love bites" at thirty thousand feet.28 In an era of hot
pants and mini skirts, the flashier the uniform, the more
attention the airlines attracted. Of course, the young and
attractive flight attendants were the key to the success of
such marketing tactics.
The airlines justified their strict hiring standards for
gender, age, and appearance by assertions that their cus-
tomers preferred seeing young, attractive, single wo-
men.2 9 They also argued that their sales were due to the
21 See Whitesides, supra note 13, at 183 (to compete, most of the airlines
adopted policies regarding sex, age, and appearance).
22 Id. at 184. Applicants were not hired if they were black, needed to wear eye-
glasses, or did not have a "good figure." In short, applicants were evaluated and
hired based mainly on their value as "sex objects". Id.
-- AsHWOOD, supra note 1, at 102.
24 Id.
,2.5 Id. at 103.
26 KANE & CHANDLER, supra note 2, at 103 (wardrobes of the different airlines
consisted of hot-pants, peekaboo pettipants, lounging pajamas, and "love at first
flight" buttons).
27 Id.
2'- Id. at 54, 294.
"I, See Wilson v. Southwest Airlines Co., 517 F. Supp. 292, 294-95 (N.D. Tex.
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success of their marketing campaigns. Southwest Airlines
in particular claimed that its attractive flight attendants
were the "largest single component" of its success.3 0 The
airline's own surveys of customers' preferences showed,
however, that "courteous and attentive hostesses" ranked
fifth in importance behind on-time departures, frequent
departures, helpful reservations and ground personnel,
and convenient departure times.'
Meanwhile, some detractors argued that such strict hir-
ing requirements were not necessary to ensure passenger
safety and to provide the most efficient and safe evacua-
tion in the event of an emergency. In fact, courts started
defining the specific purpose of the airlines and the flight
attendants in reaching their decisions.3 2 Those defini-
tions were the basis of some of the earliest reforms in hir-
ing. Federal Aviation Regulation 121-391 stated that the
function of the stewardess was "to provide the most effi-
cient egress of passengers in the event of an emergency
evacuation. ' 33 No court or regulatory agency found that
the purpose of the stewardess was to attract customers
and attention with beauty and flashy costumes. Thus, wo-
men's groups complained that the strict hiring standards
had nothing to do with the job of the flight attendant. 4
The feminist revolt swept through the airline industry
in the 1970's. 5 The revolt was led by stewardess unions
and ad hoc groups of stewardesses.3 6 The groups organ-
ized to formally protest hiring standards and treatment of
stewardesses.3 7 One common argument of the flight at-
1981) (arguing that the use of beautiful women and flashy costumes was no small
part of the airlines' enormous recent success).
.' Id. at 295.
Id. at 295-96.
.' See Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 567 F.2d 429, 440 (D.C. Cir. 1976)
(defining the purpose of the flight attendant as ensuring the safety of passengers
during an emergency), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978).
' AsHWOOD, supra note 1, at 100.
.4 KANE & CHANDLER, supra note 2, at 84.
.45 Id.
.- Id.
:,7 Id. at 92. One of these groups was Stewardesses For Women's Rights which
planned lawsuits against airlines charging discrimination against women in weight
HIRING POLICY PROBLEMS
tendants was that the hiring standards used had no rela-
tion to the ability of an applicant to perform the required
duties. For example, one court set out a very comprehen-
sive list of duties including physical activities, emergency
duties, and working conditions which comprised a flight
attendant's regular job requirements.3 Physical activities
included lifting up to 25 pounds regularly and 50 pounds
occasionally, prolonged walking, prolonged standing, re-
peated bending and stooping, occasional overhead reach-
ing, kneeling, pushing, and pulling. Emergency duties
included performing the Heimlich maneuver, lifting
emergency window exits, carrying children, pushing pas-
sengers down slides, assisting with life rafts, and operat-
ing emergency equipment.3 9 Again, the courts did not
find that the stewardesses' duties included being beautiful
or looking good in hot pants. Thus, requiring the flight
attendants to play the part of the beautiful, young, and
subservient female was a source of contention between
the employees and the airlines. As the tension increased
between the airlines and the stewardesses, several lawsuits
materialized, and flight attendants began to win cases
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
III. CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964
The 1970's witnessed great changes in the hiring stan-
dards that airlines could legally use.40 The most signifi-
cant influence on the airline industry was Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. 4  The Civil Rights Act prohibits
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, and na-
restrictions, promotional opportunities, and hiring practices. Another group
composed of slightly older flight attendants was called Mary Poppins, presumably
named for the fictional governess who flew with such dignity. Id.
3s Id.
- Burwell v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 633 F.2d 361, 365-66 (4th Cir. 1980) (de-
fining the duties of the flight attendants to determine whether the airline policy of
automatic reassignment of pregnant flight attendants had a rational basis or safety
reason).
41 See Nachman, supra note 1, at 51-56 (discussing challenges to sex, marital
status, and pregnancy restrictions under Title VII analysis).
1' Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 710, 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (1988).
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tional origin. The prohibition of sex discrimination in Ti-
tle VII was continually relied on by stewardesses to show
that hiring practices were unfair and illegal.
Ironically, the sex discrimination provisions of the Act
were added one day prior to the House passage of an
amendment by Howard Smith, Chair of the House Ways
and Means Committee.4 2 The apparent intent of his ac-
tion was to prevent the passage of the Act by confusing
the issues and adding an unpopular section to the Act.4 3
The plan failed, however, and the section prohibiting sex
discrimination had the greatest effect on the airline indus-
try and provided the basis for challenging the airline hir-
ing standards. Although there was some discussion
following the enactment of the Act about whether sex was
actually a protected category under Title VII, the amend-
ment of the Act by the Equal Employment Opportunity
Act of 1972 showed that Congress intended to combat
discrimination against women as well as other protected
groups .44
The Civil Rights Act provides:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individ-
ual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or appli-
cants for employment in any way which would deprive or
tend to deprive any individual of employment opportuni-
ties or otherwise adversely affect his status as an em-
ployee, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin.
12 110 CONG. REC. 2577 (1964).
1:1 Denis Binder, Sex Discrimination in the Airline Industry: Title VII Flying High, 59
CAL. L. REV. 1091, 1092 (1971).
1, H.R. REP. No. 92-238, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1971), reprinted in 1972
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2140-41.
4 Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1988).
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The Act also established the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission (EEOC) to help eliminate unlawful
employment practices. 46 The EEOC is vested with the re-
sponsibility of interpreting and administering the Act by
issuing employment guidelines and opinion letters. In
addition, the EEOC can hear complaints and file law-
suits. 4 7 EEOC decisions are not law, but they are afforded
a great deal of deference by courts.4 8
Section 703e does provide an exception to the prohibi-
tions of the Civil Rights Act for Bona Fide Occupational
Qualifications (BFOQ's). It is not unlawful for an em-
ployer to hire and employ employees on the basis of reli-
gion, sex, or national origin where religion, sex, or
national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification
reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that par-
ticular business or enterprise.49 Thus, while the Act seeks
to provide equal opportunity for employees, employers
do have the opportunity to demonstrate that one of these
categories is necessary for the operation of the business.
While the flight attendants were successful in arguing
that hiring practices were unfair and discriminatory under
Title VII, employers argued that their practices should be
protected under the BFOQ exception. Thus, court deci-
sions were important not only in interpreting the meaning
of Title VII and its protection against sex discrimination,
but also in defining exactly what exceptions employers
could successfully use to avoid Title VII violations. Hir-
ing only women for flight attendant positions provided
the ground for landmark decisions based on Title VII.
4,; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (1988).
41 Id. § 2000 3-5(a).
41 See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971)(stating that "the
administrative interpretation of the Act by the enforcing agency is entitled to
great deference"); see also Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 389
(5th Cir. 1971) (following the Supreme Court's holding), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950
(1971); Binder, supra note 43, at 1094 (stating that the courts do give deference to
the agency vested with the duty of interpreting the Act).
41, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1988).
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A. SEX
The Civil Rights Act brought significant changes to the
airline industry and invalidated hiring practices used by
the airlines since the 1930's.50 The earliest changes in the
industry came from challenges of hiring practices based
on sex discrimination. Diaz v. Pan American World Airways51
is the most historic case and earliest major decision using
Title VII to invalidate the airline policy of hiring only fe-
males as flight attendants. The Fifth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals in Diaz stated that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was
meant to provide equal access to the job market for men
and women. 52 Thus, Pan Am's policy of hiring only fe-
males for flight attendant positions was discriminatory
within the meaning of Title VII. 53
Pan Am tried to argue that being female was a BFOQ
for a flight attendant position. It based this argument on
alleged passenger preference for females and their ability
to better tend to the psychological needs of passengers.5 4
The Fifth Circuit rejected those BFOQ arguments and
held that the language in the Act required a BFOQ to be a
business necessity, not a business convenience.55 The
court held that "discrimination based on sex is valid only
when the essence of the business operation would be un-
dermined by not hiring members of one sex exclu-
sively." ' 56 The court also defined the primary function of
the airlines, further limiting the airlines' ability to stretch
the business necessity requirement. The primary function
I0 d. § 2000e(2)(a)-(d).
. 442 F.2d 385, 389 (5th Cir. 1971).
52 Id. at 386. Although there was little legislative history, the court stated that
"it is reasonable to assume, from a reading of the statute itself, that one of Con-
gress' main goals was to provide equal access to the job market for both men and
women." Id. The purpose of the Act was to create a foundation for nondiscrimi-
nation. Id.
s' Id. at 388.
"' The trial court based its decision to allow Pan Am to continue its hiring prac-
tices on finding that Pan Am's passengers overwhelmingly preferred female stew-
ardesses and that the females were better able to tend to the psychological needs
of passengers. Id. at 387.
55 Id. at 388.
56 Id.
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of the airlines, as determined by the court, was to safely
transport passengers; a pleasant environment was merely
tangential.5 7
The airlines' arguments that customers preferred fe-
male flight attendants and that marketing campaigns were
based on a sex appeal theme did not change the outcome
of cases similar to Diaz. Southwest Airlines asserted that
its entire marketing campaign was based on the sex ap-
peal of its female flight attendants and that the flight at-
tendants were the "largest single component" of its
financial success. 58 As in Diaz, the court held that cus-
tomer preference was not a BFOQ 59 The court adhered
to the EEOC's pronouncement that "the bona fide occu-
pation qualification as to sex should be interpreted nar-
rowly."'60 The EEOC steadfastly adhered to its position
that the only time a BFOQ is to be based on sex is
"[w]here it is necessary for the purpose of authenticity or
genuineness... e.g. an actor or actress." 6' Moreover, the
Fifth Circuit in Wilson v. Southwest Airlines Co. set out the
BFOQ two-step analysis. 62 The test asked (1) does the
particularjob under consideration require that the worker
be of one sex only; and if so, (2) is that requirement rea-
sonably necessary to the "essence" of the employer's
business.6 3
Based on the two-step test, courts have held that the
57 Id.
.1 "From the start, Southwest's attractive personnel, dressed in high boots and
hot-pants, generated public interest and 'free ink.' Their sex appeal has been
used to attract male customers to the airline. Southwest's flight attendants ...
have been featured in newspaper, magazine, billboard and television advertise-
ments during the past ten years." Wilson v. Southwest Airlines Co., 517 F. Supp.
292, 295 (N.D. Tex. 1987).
Id. at 298.
Id. (citing EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R.
§ 1604.2(a) (1965)).
11 Id. (citing EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R.
§ 1604.2(a)(2), as amended by 45 Fed. Reg. 74,676 (1980)).
2 Wilson, 517 F. Supp. at 299. The court's two-step analysis mirrored that an-
nounced previously by the Fifth Circuit. Diaz, 442 F.2d at 385; Weeks v. South-
ern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969).
wI' ilson, 517 Supp. at 299.
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airline policy of hiring females only for the job of flight
attendant was discriminatory because sex was not a re-
quirement for the job and did not relate to the essence of
the business. 64 The gender provision in the Civil Rights
Act as well as the two-step test were also used in other
challenges to hiring policies such as the requirement that
all stewardesses be unmarried.
B. MARITAL STATUS
Later decisions held that requiring female flight attend-
ants to be unmarried violated Title VII.65 The decisions
stated that applying the unmarried requirement only to
females discriminated where no such policy existed for
male employees.6 6 At the time the marital status cases
were decided, they expanded the interpretation of Title
VII. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals explained its
rationale by stating that Section 703(a)(1) of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 was not confined to explicit discrimi-
nation "solely" on the basis of sex.6 7 Instead, "Congress
intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate
treatment of men and women resulting from sex stereo-
types. Section 703(a)(1) subjects to scrutiny and elimi-
nates such irrational impediments to job opportunities
and enjoyment which have plagued women in the past." 68
Courts rejected the arguments from airlines that marital
status should be viewed as a BFOQ In Sprogis v. United
Airlines, for example, the court held that the airline failed
' Id.
"1, See Sprogis v. United Airlines, 444 F.2d 1194, 1198-99 (7th Cir. 1971) (hold-
ing that forbidding female flight attendants from marrying was sex discrimina-
tion), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991 (1971); see also Jurinko v. Edwin L. Wiegand Co.,
477 F.2d 1038, 1044 (3d Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 474 U.S. 970 (1973); Inda v.
United Air Lines, Inc., 405 F. Supp. 426, 433 (N.D. Cal. 1975), aff'd in part and
vacated in part on other grounds, 435 F.2d 554 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1007
(1977) (all holding that requiring female employees to be unmarried where there
was no such policy for male employees constituted sex discrimination).
,;, Sprogis, 444 F.2d at 1199; Colvin v. Piedmont Aviation, Inc., EMPL. PRAC.
GUIDE (CCH) 6003 (EEOC 1968).
67 Sprogis, 444 F.2d at 1198.
6. Id.
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to offer any salient rationale to support marital status as a
BFOQ.6  The court rejected the airlines' BFOQ argu-
ments which included 1) customers prefer single women,
2) marriage will lead to a drop in charm, efficiency, and
reliability, 3) working conditions and hours would detri-
mentally affect a married person's home life, and 4) the
probability of pregnancy is much higher in married
women. 70
The court used the business necessity argument from
Diaz to support its finding that customer preference of
flight attendants' marital status was irrelevant. 71 More-
over, the court held that marital status did not affect the
flight attendant's ability to perform her job and found no
merit to the arguments regarding a drop in efficiency and
reliability.72 It found that the no marriage policy discrimi-
nated against women by depriving them of the fundamen-
tal right of marriage when not applying the same policy to
male employees.73
C. PREGNANCY
Courts also held that the airlines' automatic termination
policies of pregnant flight attendants constituted sex dis-
crimination under Title VII. 74 The decisions pointed out
that, similar to marriage requirements, the airlines estab-
69 Id.
70 Id.; Cooper v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 274 F. Supp. 781, 782 (E.D. La. 1967);
American Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Local 550, 67-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH)
4356, at 4256 (1968); Neal v. American Airlines, Inc., EMPL. PRAC. GUIDE (CCH)
6002, at 4013 (EEOC 1968); Binder, supra note 43, at 1104-05.
71 Sprogis, 444 F.2d at 1199.
72 Id.
United has presented no direct, rational, or reasonably limited con-
nection between marital status, job performance, and its no-mar-
riage rule for stewardesses. United has failed to explain why
marriage should affect female flight cabin attendants' ability to meet
the requirements of that position while at the same time leaving




71 See Burwell v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 633 F.2d 361, 365-66 (4th Cir. 1980)
(holding loss of seniority and mandatory reassignment discriminatory); Gardner
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lished policies which interfered only with employment op-
portunities of women.7 5
The decisions involving pregnant flight attendants also
addressed seniority issues and required leave policies.
Courts disallowed policies taking all seniority from preg-
nant flight attendants.76 For example, Eastern established
a policy in a collective bargaining agreement requiring all
employees to be transferred to non-flying duties due to
physical incapacity, sickness, or injury.77 Employees with
physical impairments, injuries, and sicknesses were able
to retain seniority rights during such transfers. Under
Eastern's interpretation of the agreement, however, phys-
ical impairments, or sicknesses or injury did not include
pregnancy. Thus, flight attendants could not keep or ac-
crue seniority if they became pregnant.78 The court held
that although the policy appeared neutral on its face, it
impacted women by depriving them of employment op-
portunities. 79 Therefore, the court held that the policy
was a violation of Title VII. 80 There was no justification
for depriving only women of the right to keep and accrue
seniority where no such policy applied to men.
Courts also reviewed mandatory leave policies and held
that mandatory leave for the first thirteen weeks of preg-
nancy violated Title VII but mandatory leave after week
thirteen was allowable as a business necessity.8 ' The
court stated that in both categories, the key issue was
whether the mandatory leave policy was needed to ensure
v. National Airlines, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 249, 258 (S.D. Fla. 1977) (challenging ma-
ternity policies).
7 Burwell, 633 F.2d at 372-73; Gardner, 434 F. Supp. at 258-59.
M Burwell, 633 F.2d at 364-65.
77 Id. at 364.
7 Id.
79 Id.
so Id. at 365.
Is d. at 367, 371-72. The court found that the airline could not possibly uni-
formly identify flight attendants who would have difficulties with their pregnancies
before such events; therefore, during the first 13 weeks, flight duty should be the
choice of the attendant. After the first 13 weeks, the airline may make such a
judgment. Id. at 372.
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passenger safety.82 The court held that, although neutral
on its face, Eastern's mandatory leave affected only one
class of employees, pregnant women, and had a dispro-
portionate impact on the opportunities of that group.83
Establishing a business necessity was the only defense
that courts allowed. The airline failed to prove that
mandatory leave during the first thirteen weeks of preg-
nancy was necessary for the safety of the passengers.84
The court did hold that the airline's leave policy after
week thirteen was a business necessity.8 5
In 1978, Congress passed the Pregnancy Discrimination
Act (PDA)86 as an amendment to Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act. The PDA makes it illegal for employers to fire
or refuse to hire women because of pregnancy, or to de-
mote or deny promotions because of pregnancy.87 The
law states that "women affected by pregnancy, childbirth,
or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for
all employment-related purposes, including receipt of
benefits under fringe benefit programs, as other persons
not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to
work." 88
Critics argued that, despite early cases against the air-
lines and the PDA's specific prohibitions within Title VII,
they expected airlines and other industries to continue to
discriminate against pregnant women. 89 They contended
that the trend was moving away from policies which bla-
tantly discriminated to more disguised practices that in-
volved terms and conditions of employment.90 Although
the EEOC's figures showed a decline in claims filed
against employers since the mid 1980s, it reported nearly
'-2 Id. at 365.
- Id. at 369.
84 Id. at 371.
I. /d.
Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1981).
'7 Id. §§ 2000e(k), 2000e-2 (1981).
I1 ld. § 2000e(k),
81' Wonen's Groups Say Pregnancy Bias Persists 13 Years After Amendment to Title VII,
DAILY LAB. REP., July 16, 1991, DLR No. 136, at C-I.
") Id.
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2900 charges were filed in 1990." 1 In March of 1991,
USAir agreed to pay $270,000 in back pay and interest
under a consent decree involving charges of pregnancy
discrimination brought by flight attendants. 2 The EEOC
sued USAir for its policy forcing flight attendants to take
maternity leave after the thirteenth week of pregnancy.
USAir has discontinued that policy and, without admitting
guilt, agreed to the terms of the settlement including back
pay to flight attendants. 3 Most airlines now allow flight
attendants to work until their last trimester of preg-
nancy.94 An EEOC attorney stated that the pregnancy
challenge would probably be "one of the last" of the cases
on the pregnancy issue in the airline industry.9"
All of these challenges provided the structure for the
current Title VII analysis used to evaluate the claims of
discrimination based on age, weight, and appearance.
The newest claims used these historical challenges not
only for standards for hiring but also for methods of anal-
ysis and tests. The language regarding equal employment
opportunity and sexual stereotyping bolstered current
challenges and provided a framework for analyzing
claims. Most critical in this analysis was the development
of standards for evaluation and the definition of the
BFOQ
IV. CURRENT CHALLENGES
The most recent challenges to airline hiring practices
were based on a number of different theories including
age, weight, and appearance discrimination. The courts
used the traditional methods of evaluating discrimination
in these cases. Because some challenges were repeatedly
unsuccessful, the parties resorted to several different ba-







In fact, the parties did not have extremely strong argu-
ments for placing those discrimination theories under a
Title VII analysis. The challenges were not as clearly
based on sex discrimination as were the earlier challenges
against employment policies by males, married females,
and pregnant females. The traditional standards used in
the earlier suits for evaluating discrimination included
sex-plus, disparate impact, and disparate treatment.96
Although those standards were successful in early chal-
lenges based directly on sex, they were not as successful
in demonstrating discriminatory practices in the areas of
weight, age, and appearance.
A. STANDARDS
The courts traditionally evaluated discrimination suits
under Title VII based on one of three methods. The first
method, sex-plus, was used when an employee or appli-
cant was treated differently than one of the opposite sex
on the basis of a Title VII criteria (such as race) or on the
basis of some neutral criteria.97 That different treatment
was prima facie sex discrimination. The most often cited
case to illustrate sex-plus is Phillips v. Martin Marietta
Corp .98 The Supreme Court held in Phillips that a com-
pany policy not to accept job applications from women
with pre-school-age children was discriminatory where
the same policy was not enforced for men. 99 The Court
refined the sex-plus analysis to include gender, plus some
other factor which is immutable or which is a fundamental
right. 0 0 Thus, the policies forbidding married females
would fail under a sex-plus analysis. The policies discrim-
inated on the basis of sex, plus a fundamental right of
marriage. The limitations regarding immutable factors or
fundamental rights were crucial to the current challenges.
See iifra notes 97-112 and accompanying text.
E.g., Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971).
I ld. at 543-44.
Id. at 544.
o Whitesides, supra note 13, at 203.
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Second, courts used disparate treatment analysis to ex-
amine discrimination claims.' 0 ' Disparate treatment oc-
curred when an employer treated some people less
favorably than others because of race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin. Proof of motive was critical in this
analysis, and the courts developed an order of proof to
isolate improper motives.' 0 2 In proving disparate treat-
ment, the plaintiff had the initial burden of proof to show
the discriminatory treatment. If the plaintiff fulfilled this
initial burden, the burden then shifted to the defendant to
show a neutral, non-discriminatory reason for the treat-
ment. The plaintiff then could demonstrate that the neu-
tral reason given was not the true reason for the
treatment. 03 In some cases, facially different treatment
itself implied intent. 04 For example, where a claim was
based upon a policy that applied less favorably to one sex
on its face, the plaintiff need not establish any other dis-
criminatory intent. 0 5  The BFOQ exception was an ac-
cepted defense to a charge of disparate treatment.
Third, the courts used disparate impact to show that
discrimination existed. 0 6 Disparate impact analysis dif-
fered from disparate treatment because the impact analy-
sis involved practices that were facially neutral but fell
more harshly on one group than another and were not
justifiable under business necessity. 0 7 Moreover, proof
of discriminatory motive was not required under disparate
10t Phillips, 400 U.S. at 543-44; Gerdom v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 692 F.2d
602, 608 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. dismissed, 460 U.S. 1074 (1983).
102 Gerdom, 692 F.2d at 608.
103 Id.
"" E.g., International Bd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15
(1977).
105 Gerdom, 692 F.2d at 608.
'i See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971) (finding employer's
use of educational requirements were facially neutral but had disparate impact on
races); Gerdom, 692 F.2d at 611 (defining the theory as based on the analysis in
Griggs v. Duke Power Co.); Barbara A. Norris, Multiple Regression Analysis in Title
II Cases: A Structual Approach to Attacks of "Missing Factors" and "Pre-Act Discrimina-
tion, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63, 68 (1986) (demonstrating negative impact by
statistical evidence).
117 Gerdom, 692 F.2d at 611.
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impact."'0 A plaintiff was required to demonstrate only
that a policy had a larger impact on members of one
group than another. The existence of a business necessity
was an applicable defense to the disparate impact analysis.
The United States Supreme Court illustrated the dispa-
rate impact analysis in Dothard v. Rawlinson.' ° ° The plain-
tiff there claimed that statutory height and weight
requirements to serve as a prison guard were facially neu-
tral but disproportionately excluded women from em-
ployment. For example, the minimum height and weight
requirements excluded 41.13 percent of the female popu-
lation but less than one percent of the male population."o
Since the plaintiff showed the discriminatory effect of the
requirements, the burden shifted to the defendant to
show a business interest."' In that particular case, the
Court held that the defendants established a sufficient jus-
tification of the requirements." 12
Again, defenses were recognized under Title VII. The
most often used was the BFOQ. 1 3 The BFOQ exception
allowed certain practices as long as they were reasonably
necessary to the normal operation of that business or en-
terprise. 114 Thus, in all of the analysis based on sex-plus,
disparate treatment, and disparate impact, the employer
always had the opportunity to show that the treatment of
certain groups was reasonably necessary. It is important
to note, however, that the courts consistently held that a
BFOQ should be defined narrowly. 1 5 They rejected cus-
'0 International Bd. of Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335-36; Gerdom, 692 F.2d at 611.
433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977).
Id. at 329-39.
Id.
1 Id. at 331. "There was substantial testimony from experts on both sides of
this litigation that use of women as guards in 'contact' positions under the existing
conditions in Alabama maximum-security male penitentiaries would pose a sub-
stantial security problem, directly linked to the sex of the prison guard." Id. at
336.
1-1 Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1988); EEOC
Dec. No. 71-1103, EMPL. PRAC. GUIDE (CCH) 6203 (EEOC 1971).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e).
EEOC Dec. No. 71-1103, at 6203.
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tomer preference" 16 and held that a BFOQmust qualify as
a business necessity." 7 Therefore, the business necessity
test is a rather strict test to meet.
The EEOC has held that the burden of proof is on the
employer to demonstrate that a BFOQapplies to a partic-
ular job." 8 Moreover, to rely on a BFOQ the employer
must prove that he had a factual basis for believing that all
or substantially all people in a particular group are unable
to perform the duties of ajob efficiently and safely. 9 Re-
lying on the Fifth Circuit opinion in Weeks v. Southern Bell
Telephone & Telegraph Co., the EEOC agreed that employ-
ers may not assume on the basis of sexual stereotypes that
one group would be unable to perform the particular du-
ties of a job. 120
In addition, the Supreme Court held that the BFOQex-
ception was intended to be an extremely narrow excep-
tion in the case of sex discrimination.' 2' The Court
reached that decision based on the language of section
703(e) as well as the legislative history of the Act. 122
Moreover, the Court stated that it relied on the EEOC's
consistent rulings that the BFOQexception was meant to
be extremely narrow. 23 The Court therefore denounced
any stereotyping of the sexes and "romantic paternalism,"
but at the same time held that sufficient proof of safety or
other necessary criteria were legitimate bases for holding
that a particular requirement should fall within a
, Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 388 (5th Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971).
117 Id.; Wilson v. Southwest Airlines, Co., 517 F. Supp. 292, 299 (N.D. Tex.
1981).
"' EEOC Dec. No. 71-1103, at 6203.
Id.; Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 235-36 (5th Cir.
1969).
120 EEOC Dec. No. 71-1103, at 6203; IWeeks, 408 F.2d at 235-36.
12, Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 334 (1977).
122 Id.
12 ld. "We are persuaded-by the restrictive language of § 703(c), the relevant
legislative history, and the consistent interpretation of the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission-that the BFOQ exception was in fact meant to be an ex-




Courts began to require employers to prove that hiring
criteria are necessary to safe and efficient job perform-
ance. 125 Relying on Weeks v. Southern Bell Telephone & Tele-
graph Co., the Supreme Court agreed that employers must
show a factual basis that all members of a protected group
would be unable to perform the duties of a job. 126 For
example, the Supreme Court upheld a state prison re-
quirement that guards be exclusively men because the
prison presented evidence that the standard was based on
concerns over safety and a woman's ability to maintain or-
der in a maximum-security male prison. 127 The Court
reached that decision exclusively because the prison
demonstrated sufficiently that women could not perform
the job. 2  Thus, the factual basis and proof were critical
to a successful defense.
Courts also held that Title VII was enacted to provide
equal opportunity, not to tell business owners how to con-
duct their businesses. 129 In Willingham v. Macon Telegraph
Publishing Co. the court held that the Civil Rights Act
should be narrowly construed in view of congressional
purpose. °30 Keeping with that reasoning, the court said
that equal employment opportunity could not be barred
on the basis of immutable characteristics such as race and
sex. 3 ' The court then articulated the difference between
the historical challenges to discrimination and the new
cases using Title VII to protect weight and appearance.
The court said, "[A] line must be drawn between distinc-
tions grounded on such fundamental rights as the right to
have children or to marry and those interfering with the
12 I d. at 335.
125 Id. at 333.
126 Id. (citing Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir.
1969)).
127 Id. at 335.
12, Id.
129 E.g., Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publishing Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1092 (5th
Cir. 1975).
I, d. at 1091.
131 Id.
2871992]
288 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE [58
manner in which an employer exercises his judgment as to
the way to operate a business."'' 32 The court stated that
characteristics such as hair length are not immutable and
do not enjoy constitutional protections. "If the employee
objects to the grooming code he has the right to reject it
by looking elsewhere for employment, or alternatively he
may choose to subordinate his preference by accepting
the code along with the job."'' 33 The statements in Wil-
lingham certainly seemed to delineate between the histori-
cal challenges to sex discrimination and the newer
challenges most closely related to physical appearance
and grooming. The statement also showed that similar
reasoning could prevail against the newer challenges
based on characteristics such as weight.
B. WEIGHT
1. Background
The most controversial and varied results occurred in
cases challenging weight standards of the airlines. 34 The
airlines unquestionably became more lenient in their
weight policies over time. The first absolute weight limits
of 115 pounds were changed and the airlines continued to
increase the weight limits as they were challenged. The
most recent case which involved American Airlines, how-
ever, showed that the airlines were reluctant to give up
their weight standards altogether, and the courts did not
force the airlines to forfeit them. 3 5
American Airlines in particular was recently under fire
for its weight limit policies. Specifically, its critics claimed
that the weight limits were unfair because the limits were
very strict for height categories and did not give special
13.2 Id.
133 Id.
1:1 See Whitesides, supra note 13, at 195 (arguing that weight restrictions are
one of the last sexist areas remaining in the airline industry).
T1 erry Maxon, 4 Little Breathing Room: American Eases l'eight Limits for Attend-
ants, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Mar. 13, 1991, at 4D.
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weight allowances for different age categories. 136 Critics
claimed that American's policies were much stricter than
weight charts developed in 1983 for Metropolitan Life In-
surance Company's table of ideal weights for people of
medium frame. 137 That criticism was in fact valid. For ex-
ample, the weight limit for a 5 foot 2 inch female em-
ployed by American was 118 pounds compared to
Metropolitan's ideal weight of 132 pounds, a difference of
fourteen pounds. The difference between the two stan-
dards for a 5 foot 6 inch female was eleven pounds, and
the difference for females 6 feet tall was five pounds.
13 8
The critics' main argument was that the policies applied
more strictly to women than to men in comparison with
the Metropolitan standards.' 39 Females at any height
were required to weigh less than the Metropolitan stan-
dards, while men 5 feet 7 inches and taller could weigh
more than the standards; in fact, males 6 feet tall could
weigh 10 pounds more than the Metropolitan stan-
dards. 40 Critics argued that such weight policies were
not only discriminatory but also dangerous to the health
1.3 Whitesides, supra note 13, at 195-96.
''7 Id. at 196.
I'll Amy Stromberg, Weight Policy Protested, DALLAs TIMES HERALD, Mar. 31,
1987, at CI.
Weight Limits for American Airlines Compared to
Metropolitan Life Insurance Company
AA ML AA ML
Female Female Difference Male Male Difference
5'2" 118 132 14 130 141 11
5'3" 121 135 14 135 143 8
5'4" 125 138 13 140 145 5
5'5" 129 141 12 145 148 3
5'6" 133 144 11 150 151 1
5' 137 147 10 155 154 (1)
5'8" 141 150 9 160 157 (3)
5'9" 145 153 8 165 160 (5)
5'10" 149 156 7 170 163 (7)
5'11" 153 159 6 175 166 (9)
6'0" 157 162 5 180 170 (10)
Id.
'3s: Whitesides, supra note 13, at 195.
'" Id. at 197.
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of employees. For example, critics contended that studies
showed the strict policies spurred eating disorders, diet
pill addiction, and laxative abuse.' 4' Studies claimed that
many flight attendants experience these physical and psy-
chological disorders in their constant attempt to remain
thin. ,42
An important point to consider in the criticism of
American Airlines in particular, was that the very weight
standards criticized were the product of a settlement be-
tween the airline and Patricia McLoughlin from a suit filed
in 1974.14 3 The parties entered a consent decree that
took effect in 1977 and created new weight standards,' 44
while the airline denied at all times that its policies were
discriminatory. 45 The plaintiff accepted the terms of the
settlement and released all claims of discrimination
against American. 46 American contended that the terms
of the settlement required any future suit based on weight
challenges to be heard and approved by the same court in
New York which heard the McLoughlin challenge.
While critics attacked the fairness of weight limits,
American at all times stated that weight policies were
merely appearance standards. 47 For example, the airline
revised the Flight Attendant Reference Manual following
the 1974 weight challenge and subsequent settlement to
read "[a] firm, trim silhouette, free of bulges, rolls or
paunches, is necessary for an alert, efficient image."'' 48
Older arguments used by other parties, however, were
that flight attendants over the weight limits could not "fit
down the aisles" or operate emergency equipment. 49
14, Id.; Mary Suh, The Is. Reporter: A Future Up in the Air, Ms., Sept. 1989, at 83.
142 Whitesides, supra note 13, at 197.
141 McLoughlin v. American Airlines, Inc., No. 74C 1271/J, slip op. at 3
(E.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 1977) (Order approving settlement) [hereinafter 1977 Settle-
ment Order].
144 Id.
14. Id. at 2.
141i Id. at 14.
17 Whitesides, supra note 13, at 198.
14S 1977 Settlement Order, supra note 143, at 2.
149 Id.
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Exceeding the weight requirements of the airlines did not
qualify as obesity and did not automatically render flight
attendants unable to perform their duties. In fact, the
flight attendants are certified each year by the FAA.' 5 °
Any flight attendant who cannot perform his or her duties
properly is prohibited from flying. 5' This regular proce-
dure is designed to determine whether an individual is ca-
pable of performing basic operational duties.
2. Historic Success of Airlines
The airlines were historically successful in defending
weight discrimination suits, but the courts based their rea-
soning on several different theories. Some courts have
based their decisions on the mutable characteristic argu-
ment. 52 For example, the court inJarrell v. Eastern Airlines
stated that there was no medical reason for a purported
larger percentage of the American female population's in-
ability to meet the weight requirements than the male
population. 53 The court further stated that weight is sub-
ject to the control of the individual and is therefore a mu-
table characteristic.' 54  This argument parallelled the
Willingham rationale that only immutable characteristics
were protected by Title VII and that mutable characteris-
tics were under the control of the individual. Further, it is
the responsibility of the individual to comply or take an-
]., 14 C.F.R. §§ 121.417, .421, .427 (1991). Flight attendants are trained in
emergency procedures including first aid, evacuation, fire fighting, and hijacking
procedures. Id.
151 Id.
112 See EEOC v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 441 F. Supp. 626, 627 (S.D. Tex. 1977)
(holding that weight is a mutable characteristic), rev d on other grounds, 619 F.2d 81
(5th Cir. 1980);Jarrell v. Eastern Airlines, 430 F. Supp. 884 (E.D. Va. 1977) (find-
ing that weight is a mutable characteristic and not protected under Title VII),
aftd, 577 F.2d 869 (4th Cir. 1978); Peter B. Bayer, Mutable Characteristics and the
Definition of Discrimination Under Title VII, 20 U. CAL. DAVIs L. REv. 769 (1987) (ar-
guing that weight, although considered a mutable characteristic by most courts, is
not completely controllable and should not be so considered).
I. Jarrel, 430 F. Supp. at 892.
154 Id.; cf Boyd v. Ozark Air Lines, Inc., 419 F. Supp. 1061, 1064-65 (E.D. Mo.
1976) (holding that height, unlike weight, is an immutable characteristic), aff'd,
568 F.2d 50 (8th Cir. 1977).
29119921
292 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE [58
other job. Classifying weight as a mutable characteristic
also destroyed the ability of the plaintiff to claim discrimi-
nation under Title VII using the sex-plus analysis.
Other decisions stated that no constitutional right was
violated by the weight standards. According to these
cases, Title VII was an expansion of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 5 5 Without discussion, the court in Cox v.
Delta Air Lines held that weight is not immutable nor pro-
tected under the Constitution.' 56 The court in EEOC v.
Delta Air Lines, Inc. reached the same decision. 57 Again,
the argument parallelled the reasoning of the court in Wil-
lingham that weight is not an immutable characteristic and
therefore not protected by the Constitution. 58
Many courts have found no discrimination on the basis
of the disparate impact and disparate treatment analy-
sis. "'5 9 Under the disparate impact analysis, the court in
Jarrell v. Eastern Airlines found that 33.3% of the female
population of the United States could meet the demands
of the 1973 Eastern Airlines weight requirements while
43.5% of the males could meet them. 6 ' The court held,
however, that this difference was merely a statistical phe-
nomenon and did not represent any form of discrimina-
tion.' 6 ' Moreover, the court held that although the
percentage of females disciplined for exceeding weight
limits exceeded that of males, that too was not sufficient
enough to show legal significance. 62 The court did not
place any significance on the fact that weight limits for the
women were based on the small to medium frame limits
1.1 Cox v. Delta Airlines, Inc., EMP. PRAC. GUIDE (CCH) 7601 (EEOC 1976),
aff'd, 553 F.2d 99 (5th Cir. 1977); EEOC v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 441 F. Supp. at
627.
'1 Cox, at 7601.
117 EEOC v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 441 F. Supp. at 627.
-"' Willingham, 507 F.2d at 1091.
159 Janell, 430 F. Supp. at 892 (holding that statistical evidence shown was insig-
nificant and did not prove discrimination); In re National Airlines, Inc., 434 F.
Supp. 269, 275 (S.D. Fla. 1977)(holding statistics insufficient to establish
discrimination).




of the insurance charts while limits for men were based on
the medium to large frame charts. 63
Similarly, the Florida court in In re National Airlines, Inc.
held that a claim that only twenty-two percent of the fe-
males in the country could meet the airlines weight limits
while thirty percent of the males could was not statistically
sufficient to show disparate impact or discrimination.' 64
Moreover, the court held that the plaintiff failed to estab-
lish any other evidence of discrimination. 65 Beyond the
statistical evidence, the court stated that the plaintiff faced
a legal obstacle as well. The court quoted the language in
Willingham that "distinctions between men and women on
the basis of something other than immutable ... charac-
teristics do not inhibit employment opportunity in viola-
tion of [section] 703(a)."' 66 Thus, the court implied that
even if the airline applied different standards to men and
women, it would be irrelevant to the analysis of discrimi-
nation because weight was not an immutable
characteristic.
The court in National Airlines also discussed the com-
monplace argument regarding the ability of people of
greater weight to perform job duties. The airline's expert
pointed out that " 'tubbies' on airlines are less agile and
agility is an important factor...",6 The court concluded
that the airline's weight program was designed to pro-
mote service and safety and did not constitute an artificial,
arbitrary, or unnecessary barrier that Title VII was
designed to eradicate.'6 8
Id. at 889.
' National Airlines, 434 F. Supp. at 275.
Id.
Id. at 275.
167 Id. at 274.
Id. at 275.
Plaintiff's statistics, standing alone, cannot support a claim of dis-
crimination based on defendant's weight requirements, especially in
the face of the clearly convincing evidence showing the fairness of
the individual treatment of flight attendants-whether male or fe-
male . . . . National's weight program is designed to promote the
twin objectives of safety and service.
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3. Contrary Results
Weight standards did not always withstand pressure
from flight attendants and judicial scrutiny, however.
Various airlines abandoned or loosened their weight stan-
dards under pressure from women's groups and unions.
For example, American Airlines twice made significant
changes in the weight requirements due to pressure from
its flight attendants. Those weight increases in 1977 and
1991 were both made in conjunction with settlement
agreements. Time and expense of protracted litigation
was a major factor in these settlements. Perhaps even
more so, the airline wanted to avoid adverse publicity and
salvage labor relations between the airline and the flight
attendants and unions. Finally, there was the concern
about the possible outcome of weight challenges. There
was no guarantee that either side could prevail in a trial.
Some of the airlines went even further than settlements;
for example, Northwestern Airlines eliminated the use of
weight standards altogether. 69
In other cases, the courts invalidated the weight stan-
dards. Some courts held that both the standards applied
to women only and the standards applied more strictly to
women were discriminatory.170 For example, the court in
Gerdom v. Continental Airlines, Inc. held that the airline's
weight program for exclusively female flight attendants
constituted discriminatory treatment on the basis of
sex. 17 ' The court rejected the argument that the weight
standards were merely personal appearance standards
outside of the Title VII analysis. The court did not sus-
tain the defendant's arguments that the case was similar
to those allowing different grooming standards for men
and women. 172 The court based its decision on other
cases holding that grooming rules did not deprive either
I'l Suh, supra note 141, at 83.
171 Gerdom, 692 F.2d at 610; Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 567 F.2d 429,
456 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978).
,71 Gerdom, 692 F.2d at 610.
172 Id. at 606.
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sex of employment opportunities and were applied even-
handedly to both sexes. 173 In the weight case, the court
held that, unlike the grooming rules, there was a signifi-
cantly greater burden of compliance on females.
74
Some courts held that special appearance rules violated
Title VII when applied to one sex and not the other. 75 In
Carroll v. Talman Federal Savings & Loan Association of Chi-
cago, for example, the employers required only female em-
ployees to wear uniforms. The court concluded that such
a requirement was disparate treatment demeaning to wo-
men based on offensive stereotypes prohibited by Title
VII. 176 The court found that the disparate treatment re-
quiring only female employees to wear uniforms was
demeaning. The court determined that "[w]hile there is
nothing offensive about uniforms per se, when some em-
ployees are uniformed and others not there is a natural
tendency to assume that the uniformed women have a
lesser professional status than their male colleagues at-
tired in normal business clothes."' 77 Relying on this anal-
ysis as an example of policies applying to only one sex,
the court in Gerdom agreed that weight policies should be
viewed the same way. Thus, the court in Gerdom held
that the claim did indeed fall within Title VII.
178
More significantly, the Gerdom court refused to accept
the airline's contention that its policy was not discrimina-
tory because it applied to a glamorous position which
both men and women sought.' 79 The court discussed the
harmful effects of occupational cliches and quoted the
Supreme Court in Mississippi University for Women v. Ho-
gan.' 80  In Mississippi University, the Supreme Court cau-
173 Id.
"I' Id. "In those cases, unlike this case, no significantly greater burden of com-
pliance was imposed on either sex; that is the key consideration." Id.
175 E.g., Carroll v. Talman Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Chicago, 604 F.2d 1028,
1032-33 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 929 (1980).
171 Id.
177 Id. at 1033.
- Gerdom, 692 F.2d at 606.
17I Id.
1- 458 U.S. 718, 725 (1982).
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tioned against permitting gender-based classification
based on stereotypical notions of sex roles, 8' stating that
the validity of gender-based classifications must not in-
clude notions concerning the traditional or stereotyped
ideas of the roles of males and females. 182
The Gerdom court actually reached its decision based on
the disparate treatment analysis. The plaintiff sustained
her initial burden of showing discriminatory policies of
weight requirements of an all-female job classification. A
facial examination of the evidence showed that the re-
quirements were designed to apply only to female em-
ployees. 8 ' Where a claim was based on a policy which
applied less favorably to one sex, the court stated that the
plaintiff need not allege any discriminatory intent.8 4 The
court further held that the defendant, trying to use the
customer preference argument to justify its policies, did
not establish a non-discriminatory reason for the policies
and thus did not discharge its burden.' 85 Therefore, the
plaintiff succeeded in showing disparate treatment. 1 6
The court in Gerdom relied in part on the decision in
Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc. 187 In Laffey, the court held
that the employer's preference for "trimness" could be ef-
fectuated only where males and females were treated
- Justice O'Connor discussed the history of the exclusion of women from em-
ployment opportunities and noted that denying entry to men to certain profes-
sions helped to perpetrate the stereotypical view of women's work and probably
depressed wages in those fields. Id.
11 Id. at 724-25.
" Gerdom, 692 F.2d at 608.
184 Id.
The fact that this policy applied to an intentionally all-female job
classification does not alter the analysis or make the policy less
facially discriminatory. By Continental's own admission, the policy
was enforced only against women because it was not merely slender-
ness, but slenderness of female employees which Continental con-
sidered critical.
Id.
1'5 Id. at 609.
I Id. at 610.
87 Id. at 606 (citing Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 567 F.2d 429, 457 (D.C.
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978)).
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equally. 88 The court relied on an EEOC regulation that
no employee selection policy could be used for a group of
people who fell under Title VII and who, but for prior
discrimination, would be able to qualify under less strict
standards.' 89 The holding stated, however, that as long as
the company treated men and women equally, the court
could not say that weight requirements were discrimina-
tory or unreasonable. 190 Therefore, although Laffey was
often cited in support of invalidating weight standards,
the court made a rather definitive statement that its action
was not to invalidate weight standards because they were
in themselves discriminatory. In fact, the court reached
its decision only because men and women were treated
differently. The fact that airlines now apply strict stan-
dards to both men and women has made challenges on
that basis of sex discrimination difficult.
An interesting contrast to the weight case was the chal-
lenge to height limits. Courts upheld height require-
ments for pilots as a business necessity.' 9 ' In Boyd v. Ozark
Air Lines, Inc. ,t92 the plaintiff challenged the airline's mini-
mum height requirement for pilots, charging that it had a
disparate impact on women. The plaintiff's evidence
showed that the policy had a disparate impact upon wo-
men. That proof shifted the burden to the airline to show
neutral reasons for using such hiring guidelines. The air-
lines argued that the practice was a business necessity. A
business necessity, which is a defense to a charge of dis-
crimination, could show that the requirement "fosters
safety and efficiency and is 'essential to that goal.' ",193 The
court held that the airline sustained its burden by showing
18, Laffev, 567 F.2d at 457. "Under the Act, practices, procedures or tests neu-
tral on their face, and even neutral in terms of intent, cannot be maintained if they
operate to 'freeze' the status quo of prior discriminatory employment practices."
Id. (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971)).
-- 29 C.F.R. § 1607.11 (1975).
11, Laffey, 567 F.2d at 457.
191 Boyd v. Ozark Air Lines, Inc., 419 F. Supp. 1061, 1064 (E.D. Mo. 1976),
aff'd, 568 F.2d 50 (8th Cir. 1977).
I,,_ Id.
193 Id. (quoting United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc,, 479 F.2d 354 (8th Cir. 1973)).
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that pilots must have free and unfettered use of all the
instruments in the cockpit. Although the airline required
a minimum height of 5'7", the evidence showed that a re-
quirement of 5'5" would be sufficient to insure the
needed use of the instruments and reduce the disparate
impact on women at the same time. 94
The pilot case was arguably an easier or at least more
logical one than flight attendant cases, because the air-
lines reasonably showed a business necessity of requiring
that pilots be a certain height to operate the aircraft effec-
tively. The argument of business necessity did not, how-
ever, translate logically to the case of the flight attendants.
The plaintiff in Smith v. Eastern Airlines, Inc. 195 charged sex
discrimination because the airline required female flight
attendants to be 5'2" to 5'9" while it hired males 5'7" to
6'2". The plaintiff was unsuccessful in her challenge
under the disparate impact analysis because she failed to
introduce any statistics showing the facially neutral re-
quirement's disproportionate effect on women. 196 East-
ern's statistics showed an equal percentage of men and
women were disqualified by the height requirements.' 97
Under the disparate treatment analysis, the court held
that the plaintiff presented a prima facie case of discrimi-
nation by showing that a female 5'1 1" would be rejected
as a candidate for employment while a male of the same
height would not. However, the employer rebutted this
presumption of discrimination by showing the history of
the policy and the statistical basis for the differences.98
I,' ld. The court lessened the requirement because it found that
[t]he business purpose must be sufficiently compelling to override
any .. . [sexual] impact; the challenged practice must effectively
carry out the business purpose it is alleged to serve; and there must
be available no acceptable alternative policies or practices which
would better accomplish the business purpose advanced, or accom-
plish it equally well with a lesser differential .. .[sexual] impact.
Id. (quoting Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798 (5th Cir. 1971), cert.
dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971)).
111 Smith v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 651 F. Supp. 214 (S.D. Tex. 1986).
w i Id. at 218.
197 Id.
ws Id. at 220.
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In general, the court was not convinced that the policy
was based on sex discrimination. 99 The court did not ad-
dress arguments such as sex stereotypes to show that the
airline was actually stereotyping the way men versus wo-
men should look.
4. Recent Innovations
Thus, the weight cases were not consistent or predict-
able. Although some courts stated that policies must treat
men and women alike, other courts skirted the weight is-
sue or classified it outside the Title VII analysis. The un-
certainty in this area was demonstrated by the number of
recent lawsuits ending in settlements. Lawsuits were
lengthy and costly to both sides, and the law was unclear
on the issue. Therefore, the opponents compromised
with airlines changing standards to some degree but ad-
mitting no fault. While the changes were modifications of
the standards opposed by the flight attendants, they were
by no means complete repudiations of the weight policies.
The uncertainty in the area and the courts' seeming re-
luctance to classify weight policies as discrimination under
Title VII did not quiet complaints in the industry. Flight
attendants continued to maintain that the weight stan-
dards were directed primarily at women and were discrim-
inatory. For example, flight attendants for Pan American
World Airways instituted a suit against the airline in 1984
claiming that the airline did not enforce its strict weight
policy against men and did not have any policies at all for
ground agents who, like flight attendants, dealt with the
public. Their claim was that "[t]he only people they were
trying to keep slim, trim and stereotyped were the female
flight attendants. 20 0
The Independent Union of Flight Attendants, repre-
senting the Pan Am employees, filed suit after Pan Am
adopted a weight policy which automatically classified fe-
I! d.
2-""' John Burgess, Pan Am to Pay S2.35 Million to Settle Suit Over Weight; 116 Female
Attendants to Share Payment, WASH. POST, Sept. I, 1989, at C4.
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male flight attendants as "medium" body frames but clas-
sified men as "large" body frames in height-weight charts
used to establish weight limits for employees. 20  The
union claimed that the policy automatically allowed men
to have higher weights but still meet the requirements.0 2
The lawsuit was finally settled in 1989, with the airline
agreeing to pay $2.35 million to flight attendants who
were suspended, denied promotion, fired, or forced to re-
sign because of the weight policy. 20 3 Under the settle-
ment, all employees were classified as "medium" body
frames, and both sexes received the opportunity to be re-
classified if doctors determined that the employee had
larger bone size.20 4
Pan Am was not the only airline that continued to be
challenged on its weight standards. Flight attendants at
American Airlines complained about weight requirements
which they claimed were not only too strict but also dis-
criminatory on the basis of sex and age. Sherri Capello, a
25-year flight attendant, was one of the employees fired
because she failed to meet the 129-pound limit for a 5-
foot-5 woman. Cappello claimed that ".... the company is
wrong to think that passengers want to return to that 50s
and 60s image of, 'Fly me, I'm Sally.' ",205 She claimed
that she never had a passenger refuse a meal tray because
she was too fat and that " '. . . no one's going to refuse my
help in jumping out of a burning airplane because I'm a
little heavy.' ",206 American's flight attendants claimed
that the weight policies show the industry's reluctance to
shed the "coffee, tea, or me" image. 0 7
This debate between the flight attendants and the air-




205 Marjie Lundstrom, American s Fat Fight Brings Back 'Coffee, Tea or Me' Days,
GANNErr NEWS SERVICE, Apr. 15, 1991, (available in LEXIS, Nexis library, Gan-




line has raged since the early 1970's. American's flight
attendants would prefer to have no weight requirements.
Association of Professional Flight Attendants president,
Cheryle Leon, said that flight attendants were "safety pro-
fessionals, not models" and that they "should be evalu-
ated on their skills, capabilities and job performance, not
their weight. '12 0  Airline officials maintained that they
should have some control over personnel. That control
included the right to "insist that our employees adhere to
a grooming standard and also be presentable to the pub-
lic." 09 Because the parties could not agree, the debate
resulted in several lawsuits.
These suits by individuals, the EEOC, and the Associa-
tion of Professional Flight Attendants (APFA) against
American Airlines brought on the basis of its weight poli-
cies were consolidated and resulted in a settlement which
made major changes in the weight standards for height
categories as well as age categories.2 1 0 American, which
historically enforced the most strict standards, agreed to
modify its requirements. 21  For example, American in-
creased the weight allowances in most height categories
and added the allowances for the age categories.
2011 Maxon, supra note 135, at 4D.
209 Id.
210 Id.
211 Whitesides, supra note 13, at 195; Maxon, supra note 135, at 4D.
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WEIGHT LIMITS FOR FEMALE FLIGHT
ATTENDANTS 212
Maximum Weights for a 5 foot 5 inch Airline
Flight Attendant
AGE 25 35 45 55
American, old limits 129 129 129 129
American, new limits 136 142 148 154
United 137 140 143 146
Delta 138 140 142 142
USAir 138 141 144 147
Pan Am, small frame 143 146 149 152
Pan Am, large frame 151 154 157 160
American's new standards were based on NHAMES II
demographic tests of the standard sizes of the American
population. American employed Bernard R. Siskin,
Ph.D., an expert economist trained in advanced statistical
techniques, to develop new weight standards to insure
that an equal percentage of the population in each sex,
height, and age category could meet the requirements. 1 3
Dr. Siskin worked closely with attorneys for the EEOC
and the APFA to produce a final version of the weight ta-
bles which the settlement agreement stated were non-dis-
criminatory. 2 4 The new standards were set so that forty
percent of the general population met the standards. The
spokesman for American Airlines stated that the new stan-
dards were based on statistical data, that they were neutral
and non-discriminatory, and that both sides agreed to use
them. 2 5 Each allowance for weight in each age bracket
was determined in the same way. Thus, American claimed
that its standards were not arbitrary as compared to some
other airlines' standards. American claimed that some of
its competitors merely added three pounds to each age
bracket but did not base the increases on any data show-
2,2 Maxon, supra note 135, at 4D.
21:1 Brief in Support of Settlement at 5, APFA v. American Airlines, Inc., (N.D.
Tex. 1991) (CA No. 4-88-791E).
2 1I /d.
215 Maxon, supra note 135, at 4D.
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ing the percentage of the population meeting the
standards.
5. The Future in Weight Suits
The number of recent settlements signaled a trend to-
ward the willingness of the airlines and the courts to relax
weight standards. Success in weight suits, however, de-
pended on whether the plaintiffs refined their arguments.
For example, the Supreme Court held, based on the Diaz
decision, that employers must prove that certain hiring
standards were necessary in order to use them.2"6 The
Supreme Court has also adopted the position that it was
not permissible to use stereotyped characteristics as a ba-
sis of hiring.21 7 Thus, the flight attendants who con-
tended that weight standards were applied more strictly to
women than men could possibly argue that the airlines
should have to prove that the weight standards were nec-
essary in order to enforce them. Moreover, the flight at-
tendants could argue that the airlines' use of stricter
standards for women was based on the stereotyped notion
of the way that a woman should look, which dates back to
the use of the stewardess as a sex object and marketing
tool. Because the courts defined BFOQs very narrowly,
the flight attendants could further argue that the airlines
should not be allowed to claim that such weight require-
ments were a BFOQ because there is no evidence that a
thin flight attendant is a business necessity. These argu-
ments would only be useful, however, if the flight attend-
ants succeeded in showing that either women were
affected differently from men or if they succeeded in over-
coming the argument that the weight standards were
merely grooming requirements and not protected under
Title VII.
As a completely different method of attack, flight at-
'-,, Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 333 (1977).
217 Id. at 334; Diaz v. Pam Am. World Airlines, Inc. 422 F.2d 385, 387 (5th Cir.
1971); Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 235-36 (5th Cir.
1969).
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tendants could attempt to have weight classified as a disa-
bility or other handicap. The federal government
established the Rehabilitation Act to create equal oppor-
tunity for the handicapped. The Rehabilitation Act of
1973 provides that, "[no] otherwise qualified individual
with handicaps in the United States . . . shall, solely by
reason of her or his handicap, be excluded from the par-
ticipation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance .... ,218
The statute itself and the regulations used by the De-
partment of Health and Human Services recognized phys-
ical impairment or handicap in three possible situations.
The first situation included people who presently have an
impairment which substantially limits a major life activ-
ity.21 9 The second encompassed those who were so lim-
ited in the past.220 The third covered people who were
regarded by others as handicapped. 22 '
Such a challenge based on weight as a handicap failed
under state law in Underwood v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. 222
The plaintiff in Underwood claimed that her overweight
status qualified her to be classified as a handicapped indi-
vidual. 223 The plaintiff was suspended after her weight
exceeded the company's weight limits. TWA's appear-
ance program contained guidelines for appearance to en-
sure a "competent professional business look" in the
company uniform.224 Those standards included weight
among eight different personal grooming basics such as
uniform articles, accessories, footwear, jewelry, cosmetics,
2- 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (Supp. 1988).
2-1" 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B)(i) (Supp. 1992).
221. Id. § 706(8)(B)(ii).
221 § 706(8)(B)(iii); Tudyman v. United Airlines, 608 F. Supp. 739, 744 (C.D.
Cal. 1984).
222 710 F. Supp. 78 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
2:1 The plaintiff contended that the weight program violated the handicap law
because the law prohibited an employer from refusing to hire or discharging an
employee because of disability. Id.
"", Id. at 80.
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nail polish, and hair styling.2 25 The plaintiff contended
that suspending her for her weight was handicap
discrimination.
The New York law prohibited an employer from refus-
ing to hire or discharging an employee because of a disa-
bility.22 16 The court determined that the term disability
included physical, mental, and medical impairments.2 27
The court noted that a disability must manifest itself in
one of two ways: "1) by preventing the exercise of a nor-
mal bodily function, or 2) by being 'demonstrable by
medically accepted clinical or laboratory diagnostic tech-
niques.' ",228 The court found that, in contrast to other
cases where a plaintiff was clinically diagnosed as obese,
the present case was one where the plaintiff, if overweight,
nevertheless did not qualify and had not been diagnosed
as obese.2 29 Moreover, the plaintiff did not have any med-
ical condition or impairment of bodily function. The
plaintiff, therefore, did not fall within the protected class
of handicapped under New York law.230
Similarly, a California district court rejected a claim of
handicap discrimination for weight under the Rehabilita-
tion Act of 1973 for two reasons. 23 ' First, the court held
that because the applicant was a bodybuilder, his weight
was within his control and was absolutely a mutable char-
acteristic which was not protected.23 2 Second, the court
held that the applicant could not win a suit based on the
handicap argument for denial of only one job.2 3
The court noted that the plaintiffs unique body compo-
sition was not a disorder, disfigurement, or loss. In fact,
his condition was self-imposed and voluntary. 34 More-
225 Id. at 78, 80.
- Id. at 83.
227 Id.
'-"-' Id. (citations omitted).
229 id. at 84.
231. Id.
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over, the plaintiff had no impairment and was not limited
in major life activities. As such, the plaintiffs claim was
not meritorious. The court also found that the failure to
meet requirements for a single job does not qualify as lim-
iting a major life activity and therefore does not qualify as
a handicap.235
The court suggested that a plaintiff could possibly use
weight as a handicap if the weight problem resulted from
a physical disorder such as a gland problem. Such a disor-





Another recent challenge to hiring and employment
policies was on the basis of age. Historically, the courts
invalidated airline policies that fired female flight attend-
ants at younger ages than male airline employees. Many
airlines had policies of grounding flight attendants be-
tween the ages of thirty-two and thirty-five.23 7 These early
policies did not affect most flight attendants because they
married before these ages and were fired under marriage
policies.23 8 One of the goals of the flight attendant pro-
gram was to have single women who were attractive to
travelers. Being attractive to customers meant that some
stewardesses eventually married customers. Airline exec-
utives believed that if a woman was around until the
mandatory retirement age, the personnel department was
not doing its job in selecting attractive women because a
high turnover rate was a sign of success in the quality of
the stewardesses hired.2 39 One executive said that if ten-
ure started to reach a certain point, "I'd know we were
23'r Id.
23; See infra notes 371-93 and accompanying text.
2:17 Binder, supra note 43, at 1110. The corresponding retirement age for male
stewards was 65 years of age. Id.
23 S Id.
211Whitesides, supra note 13, at 183.
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getting the wrong kind of girl. She's not getting
married. 240
In several decisions the EEOC invalidated these
mandatory retirement policies. 241 The EEOC found that
airlines were using 65 as a retirement age for all employ-
ees except pilots and stewardesses. Pilots, of course, had
a specific exception under FAA rules regarding retirement
age based on safety concerns.242 No similar reason ex-
isted in the FAA age-based retirement rules for flight at-
tendants. Rather, the airlines themselves established ages
thirty-two to thirty-five as retirement age for stewardesses
and justified these retirement ages by contending that
since the stewardess was the image of the industry show-
ing its vitality and youth, the older employees would lose
the enthusiasm required in their performance.24 3 In chal-
lenges to the retirement policies, the EEOC held that age
was not a BFOQ for stewardesses and that the retirement
policies clearly violated Title VII because no similar re-
tirement age was placed on male flight attendants.244
The airlines claimed that customers preferred young
flight attendants in effect to bolster their BFOQ argu-
ment. The EEOC rejected that argument and further
showed that the airlines could not support such claims.24 5
The EEOC noted a 1965 survey by the Airways Club in
which members stated that the age of the stewardess did
not matter and that the airlines should not have age ceil-
ings for flight attendants. 246 The court found that the re-
sults demonstrated that passengers did not prefer a
2,1o KANE & CHANDLER, supra note 2, at 103.
2, Dodd v. American Airlines, Inc., EMP. PRAC. GUIDE (CCH) 6001 (EEOC
1968); Colvin v. Piedmont Aviation, Inc., EMP. PRAC. GUIDE (CCH) 6003 (EEOC
1968).
242 See infra notes 274-79 and accompanying text.
2.4: Dodd, EEOC Dec. 6001, at 4007. The airlines argued that senior steward-
esses would lose the motivation necessary for the job and provide poor service
which would result in the loss of business and goodwill for the airline. They fur-
ther argued that the changes associated with menopause would interfere with the
stewardess' performance. Id.
211 Id. at 4009.
215Id. at 4008.
216 Id. at 4008 n. 17.
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stewardess of a particular age group. 24 7
2. Age Discrimination in Employment Act
Since those early decisions, the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA) made discrimination on the ba-
sis of age illegal. 248 The purpose of the ADEA was to pro-
mote employment of older people based on ability.249
The legislation resulted from extensive Congressional
findings regarding the effects of age discrimination.25 °
The Act combatted discrimination by establishing broad
247 Id.
1965 Airways Club Survey
1. Do you think that the airlines should have age ceilings for
stewardesses?
Yes No Don't Care
2436 3033 776
2. Would the age of the stewardess matter to you?
Yes No Don't Care
1533 3361 1091
3. Do you prefer a stewardess of a particular age group?
Yes No Don't Care
1693 2575 1342
4. If you answered yes to #3, which group do you prefer?
18-25 26-30 31-35 36-40 40-above
328 837 363 188 35
2_8 Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1982 &
Supp. 1988).
- Id. § 62 1 (b).
2 Id. Congressional findings included:
(1) in the face of rising productivity and affluence, older workers find
themselves disadvantaged in their efforts to retain employment, and
especially to regain employment when displaced from jobs;
(2) the setting of arbitrary age limits regardless of potential for job
performance has become a common practice, and certain otherwise
desirable practices may work to the disadvantage of older persons;
(3) the incidence of unemployment, especially long-term unemploy-
ment with resultant deterioration of skill, morale, and employer ac-
ceptability is, relative to the young ages, high among older workers;
their numbers are great and growing; and their employment
problems grave;
(4) The existence in industries affecting commerce, of arbitrary dis-
crimination in employment because of age, burdens commerce and
the free flow of goods in commerce.
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prohibitions against certain hiring and employment
practices.
The Act provided that employers may not use age as a
basis for hiring. The act states: "It shall be unlawful for
an employer (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge
any individual or otherwise discriminate against any indi-
vidual with respect to his compensation, terms, condi-
tions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's age. .... ,,251 An employer was also prohibited
from segregating or classifying employees in any way
which would deprive them of opportunities on the basis of
age and from reducing employee wages in order to com-
ply with the Act.252
As it was originally adopted, the Act protected people
in the forty to sixty-five age group.253 Later the upper age
limit was increased to seventy years of age. 254 Today the
upper limit no longer exists.2 5 The minimum age pro-
tected, however, is still forty.256 In order to assert age dis-
crimination, a claimant must show that he was in the
protected age group, that he was able and qualified to
perform the job, that he was discharged or treated ad-
versely, and that the employer replaced him with a
younger person or gave benefits to a younger person.257
The employer then may rebut that prima facie case by
showing a justifiable reason for the discrimination or by
demonstrating that the decision was based on reasons
other than age.258
211 Id. § 623(a).
212 Id. § 623(a)(2), (3).
2',1 ADEA Amendments of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, § 12, 81 Stat. 602 (1967)
(current version at 29 U.S.C. § 631 (1988)) (prior to the 1978 and 1986
amendments).
2., ADEA Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-256, § 3(9) 92 Stat. 189 (1978)
(codified at 29 U.S.C. § 631 (1988)).
2 29 U.S.C. § 631(a) (Supp. V 1987).
2511 Cheryl Hammond Raper, Comment, Age Discrimination in the Airline IndustrN: Is
Age a Bona Fide Occupational Qualification for the Position of Pilot?, 55J. AIR L. & COM.
543, 553 (1989).
- Id. at 554 (based on McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792
(1972)).
2" Bittar v. Air Canada, 512 F.2d 582, 582-83 (5th Cir. 1975).
19921 309
310 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE [58
The BFOQ exceptions existed under ADEA and served
as a justifiable reason for discrimination under the analy-
sis in Bittar v. Air Canada.259 Courts developed the BFOQ
discussion by using Title VII standards by analogy. 260
The first test was that an employer must show a rational
basis for using age. 26' The Seventh Circuit in Hodgson v.
Greyhound Lines, Inc. adopted the test from Diaz v. Pan
American World Airways, Inc. ,262 a Title VII action.263 The
plaintiff in Hodgson challenged Greyhound's policy of re-
fusing to hire drivers over the age of thirty-five. Grey-
hound claimed that age was a BFOQ for a position as a
driver because hiring new drivers over the age of thirty-
five resulted in a safety risk due to incomplete training
and degeneration of abilities that occur with age. 64 The
court, using the adopted Title VII rationale, held that
"Greyhound must demonstrate that it has a rational basis
in fact to believe that elimination of its maximum hiring
age will increase the likelihood of risk of harm to its pas-
sengers. ' 26 ' The court also added that the company had
to demonstrate only a "minimal increase in risk of harm"
where saving just one person would justify the hiring
limitations 266
In Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc. ,267 the Fifth Circuit
added a second requirement to the analysis used by the
Seventh Circuit in Hodgson. In addition to the "essence of
operations" test, an employer claiming that a particular
requirement was a BFOQ must also show that all appli-
cants of that age group would be unable to perform the
251, Id.
2 Raper, supra note 256, at 558-59.
261 Hodgson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 499 F.2d 859 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1122 (1975); Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 388
(5th Cir. 1971).
'-62 442 F.2d at 385.
2 1 Hodgson, 499 F.2d at 862.
261 Id. at 863. Greyhound urged that the abolition of its hiring policy would




531 F.2d 224, 235-37 (5th Cir. 1976).
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job.268 That requirement was adopted from the analysis
in Weeks v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co. 269 where
the court said that an employer must show reasonable
cause that it believes that all people in a group would be
unable to perform certain duties effectively and safely or
that the employer would be unable to analyze the mem-
bers of the group individually. 70
The Supreme Court later resolved the BFOQ issue by
adopting a combination of these tests. The Court held in
Western Airlines, Inc. v. Criswell27' that an employer must
show that the challenged age requirement was related to
the essential operation of the business and must demon-
strate that either there was a rational basis for believing
that all members of a certain group would be unable to
perform the duties or that it was impossible to evaluate all
of the members of the group on an individual basis.272
Therefore, the court settled the analysis used for age dis-
crimination and BFOQs. 2 73 This analysis would also ap-
ply to flight attendants in a challenge for age
discrimination. The airline would have to prove that the
challenged age requirement was essential to performing
the duties of a flight attendant and that all flight attend-
ants of the challenged age would not be able to perform
the duties or it would be impossible to evaluate all candi-
dates individually. That burden seems to be a rather on-
erous one if the airline was trying to enforce an age limit
such as forty years of age.
The airline industry in general is subject to special rules
based on the safety analysis. These special rules apply be-
cause airlines are entrusted with thousands of lives every
day. 74 One example of a use of a BFOQ in the age cate-
gory is the case of pilots. This unique aspect of the airline
269 Id.
269 Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969).
2 Id. at 235.
._,, 472 U.S. 400 (1985).
I-,72 d. at 416-17.
27: Raper, supra note 256, at 562.
27 ld. at 563.
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industry is illustrated by the Federal Aviation Administra-
tion's (FAA) regulation which requires mandatory retire-
ment for pilots of commercial aircraft.2 75 That rule states
that no certificate holder may use a pilot's services on air-
craft under the regulation of the section if that pilot has
reached the age of sixty.2 76  Thus, pilots are effectively
forced to retire at the age of sixty. Airlines do have differ-
ent policies regarding the use of such pilots. While some
enforce retirement, others move former pilots who have
reached the age of sixty to positions as flight engineers.277
Again, the justification for this policy is safety.278 There
are countervailing arguments that increased experience
offsets any safety concerns.2 79 No such safety analysis is
justified for flight attendants. There are no arguments,
however, that flight attendants should be forced to retire
because they are unable to perform their duties as a result
of age.
3. Current Criticisms
Despite the ADEA, problems still exist. One of the crit-
icisms is that the airlines have used backhanded methods
to continue to discriminate.280 Commentators claim that
2.5 FAA Age Sixty Rule, 14 C.F.R. § 121.383(c) (1989).
27, Id.
277 See Id. § 121.383(c) (requiring pilots to meet certain medical requirements
and limit activity to non-carrier positions or accept a demotion in cockpit posi-
tion); see also Trans World Airlines v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 116 (1985)(com-
pany required pilots approaching 60 to bid for flight engineer position but did not
guarantee such a position and forced pilots who did not get the position to retire);
Aman v. FAA, 856 F.2d 946, 948 (7th Cir. 1988) (noting that pilots must meet
medical requirements and restrict activities or accept a demotion to flight engi-
neer or flight instructor).
278 Raper, supra note 256, at 567.
_79 Id. at 578-79. Some courts have argued that the physical effects of aging
may be offset with the increased experience of the older pilot and that perhaps
individual testing is a better way to gauge whether a pilot is physically unable to
perform his or her job rather than having blanket prohibitions associated with
age. Aman, 856 F.2d at 948, 948, 954-57. The FAA itself noted that "medical
science may at some future time develop accurate, validly selective tests which
would safely allow selected pilots to fly in air carrier operations after age sixty."
24 Fed. Reg. 9772 (1959).
2 Why Should You Care?, SKYWORD, June 1989, at 7.
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the airlines use weight restrictions as a disguised way to
discriminate on the basis of age.28' Critics also claim that
the airlines discriminate on the basis of age because
young flight attendants' salaries and benefits are much
less expensive than those of their older, more exper-
ienced counterparts.282 According to one critic, weight
restrictions that do not make allowances for weight gain
as flight attendants age are used to terminate older flight
attendants and save the airlines labor costs. 28 3 Weight
maximums disfavor older flight attendants who are more
expensive to the airline because of their higher salaries,
medical costs, and retirement costs. 2 4 This criticism is a
source of contention between the airlines and flight at-
tendants. Airlines such as American continue to argue
that there is no physiological reason for people to gain
weight as they age.28 5 Moreover, the airline argues that
people begin to lose weight at a certain point.28 6 Others
claim that age causes metabolic changes that cause weight
gain. 2 8
7
Some flight attendants at major airlines such as Ameri-
can, TWA, and Northwest see the intense competition in
the industry, largely brought about by deregulation, as
the cause of some of the age discrimination.2 88 In particu-
lar, flight attendants complain about the two-tiered wage
scales. 289 They maintain that replacing older "A" scale
2'-' Id.; Whitesides, supra note 13, at 197.
2"2 Whitesides, supra note 13, at 177. Statistics show that new flight attendants
are hired at half the cost of more experienced employees. Id. Newly hired flight
attendants at American Airlines earn a monthly base of $1,055 while flight attend-
ants with twelve years of experience earn $2,306 per month. Agreement Between
American Airlines, Inc. and the Flight Attendants in the Service of American Air-
lines, Inc., Art. 3, 3a-I (effective Dec. 29, 1987).
2' Whitesides, supra note 13, at 177.
2" Id. at 198.
'' American has traditionally made no weight allowances for different age cate-
gories. Maxon, supra note 135, at 4D.
286 Id.
,,8- Whitsides, supra note 13, at 218; Fear of Fat: The Medical Evidence, CONSUMER
REP., Aug. 1985, at 455.
281 Marilyn Gardner, Flight Attendants See Trouble in the Skies, CHRISTIAN SCI. MON-
ITOR, Mar. 9, 1988, at 3.
28 Id.
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workers with younger "B" scale workers is an attempt to
reverse the trend toward long-term careers back to short-
term jobs.290 The flight attendants feel that the salary,
benefit, and status gains of the 1960's and 1970's are be-
ing eroded by the departure of experienced employees
who are being replaced by new hires at much lower pay
scales. 291' A veteran TWA flight attendant complains that
the airlines "don't want people like me at the highest pay
scale who have long vacations and a retirement plan.
They want a fast turnover of 20-year-olds. 2 92
While the ADEA was designed to prevent discrimina-
tion, another criticism was that it did not protect some of
the age groups that suffered under airline policies. For
example, the airlines' original policies forced retirement
between the ages of thirty-two and thirty-five. Although
the EEOC and the courts held that those age require-
ments were discriminatory specifically because they were
applied to women and not men, critics claim that the air-
lines still have that age cutoff in mind.293 Therefore, wo-
men in their thirties may not be hired as flight attendants
because of the airlines' bias toward younger flight attend-
ants. Women in their thirties are not protected under the
ADEA because its minimum protected age is forty.
Some attendants, however, were successful in attacking
hiring practices based on age. For example, in a consent
decree with Eastern Airlines, Eastern's employees ob-
tained an affirmative action program in which the airline
agreed to "hire flight attendants in the protected age
group in proportion to their numbers in the applicant
pool. ' 294 Moreover, the airline agreed to publicize its
equal opportunity employer status and to include a pho-




29:1 Whitesides, supra note 13, at 197.
2-1' EEOC v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., No. 81-2165-CIV-EBD, 1982 WL 284, at *6
(S.D. Fla. Mar. 26, 1982).
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the recruitment brochures.29 5 The airline amended its
standards for hiring to include requirements that all can-
didates must be above-average in appearance for their age
and a policy that non-distracting wrinkles, facial lines, and
gray hair did not disqualify a candidate.296 Piedmont Air-
lines announced a program to recruit older flight attend-
ants, and other airlines reportedly followed suit.297 The
Association of Flight Attendants, a union representing
thirty-eight percent of the 60,000 flight attendants nation-
wide, reported that forty-nine percent of its members
were older than thirty-four.2 98 Despite these facts, com-
plaints remained about the treatment of older flight at-
tendants and the lack of protection afforded under the
ADEA.
4. Age-Related Appearance
Still another problem with the ADEA was that it did not
prohibit discrimination based on age-related appearance.
Some groups argued that age-related appearance was a
semi-immutable characteristic and protected under Title VII
standards. 299 As the guidelines in the Eastern consent de-
cree indicated, age-related appearance was a factor in the
decision to hire flight attendants in certain age groups.
For example, only after the Eastern consent decree was
the use of policies prohibiting the hiring of women with
wrinkles and gray hair forbidden. 0 0 Thus, women were
concerned that such discrimination would not be pro-
tected under the ADEA.
Recent suits have been based on age-related appear-
291i Id.
297 Mark Mayfield & Lori Sharn, Move to Older Flight Attendants Takes Off, USA
TODAYJan. 31, 1989, at 3A.
,'9 Id.
2119 Patti Buchman, Note, Title 17I Limits on Discrimination Against Television
Anchorwomen on the Basis of Age-Related Appearance, 85 CoL. L. REv. 190, 198-99
(1985).
: EEOC v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 1982 WL 284, at *6.
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ance discrimination.3 ' In the highly publicized case of
Christina Craft, the plaintiff, a female newscaster, first
claimed that she suffered from sex discrimination because
she was subjected to a rigorous dress code and criticism of
her appearance while male employees did not endure the
same conditions. 2 The court found no merit in her
claim and held that a company has the right to create an
image by its employee's appearance. 3 The court held
that employers can require grooming standards in order
to maintain a professional appearance consistent with
standards of the community. 4 Second, the plaintiff
claimed that the defendant's reasons for removing her
from her position were based on sex. The plaintiff al-
leged that her boss removed her because she was "too
old, too unattractive, and not deferential enough to
men." 30 5 The court found insufficient evidence to con-
clude that there was any discrimination. 6 Moreover, the
court stressed the role that appearance plays in some jobs,
stating that industries such as television demand a high
quality of appearance that employers may regulate. 7
A good analogy for the age issue as it relates to flight
attendants is the case study involving television
anchorwomen. In both fields, appearance is a major fo-
cus, and in both fields, women claim that they are subject
to discrimination because of age-related appearance. For
example, several years ago, there were few television
.111 Craft v. Metromedia, Inc., 572 F. Supp. 868 (W.D. Mo. 1983); EEOC v. East-
ern Airlines, Inc., 1982 WL 284, at *5.
31) Craft, 572 F. Supp. at 876.
-:, Id. at 877. "Title VII 'was never intended to interfere in the promulgation
and enforcement of personal appearance regulations by private employers.' " Id.
(quoting Knott v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 527 F.2d 1249, 1251-52 (8th Cir.
1975)). "[A] private employer may require male employees to adhere to different
modes of dress and grooming than those required of female employees and such
does not constitute an unfair employment practice within the meaning of 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)." Id. (citing Baker v. California Land Title Co., 507 F.2d
895, 898 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1046 (1975).
:'" Id.




anchorwomen over the age of forty.30 8 There was evi-
dence that networks believed that women over forty were
"too old" or "too unattractive" to be anchorwomen. 9
Where men with gray hair and laugh lines were distin-
guished, women with such characteristics were just old.31
Critics contend this differential treatment is clearly dis-
criminatory on the basis of sex because it emphasizes a
youthful appearance for women where no such policy ex-
ists for men.3 Similarly, some flight attendants claim
that only women are subject to age-related discrimination.
The courts would most likely use the sex-plus analysis
in adjudicating age-related appearance discrimination
suits. In addition to basing hiring decisions on sex, em-
ployers consider other characteristics, which discriminate
against particular subgroups within the gender. In this
case, the discrimination is based on age-related appear-
ance of females. Title VII characteristics, which employ-
ers are forbidden to use, are immutable characteristics as
well as fundamental rights.3 2 Claimants under the age-
related discrimination suits could allege that age-related
appearance is analogous to other immutable characteris-
tics such as race. In that argument, claimants could say
that, like race, aging is an unalterable part of an individ-
ual. One rebuttal to this allegation is that the aging
process can be arrested with procedures such as plastic
surgery. Even under this analysis, claimants may argue
that age-related appearance is at least semi-immutable be-
cause requiring surgery is extreme, and therefore it
should be included in the category with other immutable
,Io Id. "[Diefendant merely acted to correct appearance problems which plain-
tiff was unable or unwilling to remedy. The actions taken by defendant in regard
to plaintiff's appearance were not the result of any general animus toward wo-
men .. " Id.
: 1, Barthel, Network Newswomen Speak Out, TV GUIDE, Aug. 13, 1983, at 10-11!.
310 Sally Smith, Television Vewswomen's Suit Stirs a Debate on Values in Hiring, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 6, 1983, at 44.
:11 Buchman, supra note 299, at 192.
-312 Whitesides, supra note 13, at 203.
3" Buchman, supra note 299, at 197. "Aging, like race, is a virtually unalterable
aspect of one's physical appearance." Id.
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characteristics.
It is important to note the difference in analysis be-
tween age and age-related appearance. Age is not pro-
tected under Title VII but is instead included in separate
legislation of the ADEA' 1 5 Age-related appearance does
not fall within the ADEA. Therefore, some argue that the
proper place to address the issue is within Title VII. In
the Title VII analysis, it could be viewed as an immutable
characteristic as opposed to a grooming requirement
which is easily changed and not protected. 6 Thus, that
immutable characteristic should be viewed as a "plus" fac-
tor in the sex-plus analysis and should become an im-
proper basis for employment decisions.3 7
Age-related appearance standards may make challenges
on the basis of appearance easier to show. Appearance is
hard to quantify, but with a factor such as age added, an
employer would have to demonstrate that the age did not
play a part in the determination to hire an employee.
Moreover, wrinkles and gray hair are easier to identify
and define than an unattractive nose or chin or uneven
features. Thus, perhaps age-related appearance stan-
dards could provide a solid bridge into challenges based
on physical appearance.
114 Id. at 198-99.
. See supra notes 248-58 and accompanying text.
Buchman, supra note 299, at 200. Regulations distinguish between the sexes
on the basis of mutable characteristics which are completely within the control of
the individual and therefore have insignificant effects on opportunities for em-
ployment. Id.
17 Id. at 203.
[Tjhe requirement of a youthful appearance for female but not male
anchors constitutes an impermissible 'plus' factor under section
703(a). As an immutable or semi-immutable physical characteristic,
youthful appearance may not be imposed as an employment crite-





1. Appearance Requirements in the Industry
Appearance is another emerging basis for challenges
under Title VII. Airlines have historically had very strict
appearance requirements.38 Candidates have alleged
that they have not been hired because they did not have
"Miss America Looks. ' 19 Indeed, the earlier use of the
stewardess as what critics have called a "marketing tool"
and "sex object" showed the rationale behind these strict
appearance requirements. Flight attendants claim that
airlines hire only beautiful women and then make them
over to accommodate airlines' own idea about the ulti-
mate woman. Many accomplish that goal through train-
ing programs.
Training programs were historically formulated to
mold grooming habits and appearance into the airlines'
ideals.3 20 Flight attendants reported that in "stewardess
college" they spent the majority of the time getting make-
overs and changes in hair cuts, clothing, makeup, walk,
and behavior, all for the purpose of maintaining an image
of glamour.3 2 ' Flight attendants spent about 20 percent
of their training time learning safety aspects of the job
and about 80 percent learning meal service techniques
and grooming. 22 Thus, airlines historically used training
as a time for teaching grooming standards and indoctri-
nating its employees to its expectations.
Today, there is still debate regarding the airlines influ-
ence over its employees' grooming habits. Continental
Airlines fired a ticket agent who refused to wear makeup,
and that action focused attention on grooming policies
for female employees, which critics call examples of sex-
-" Underwood v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 710 F. Supp. 78, 80 (S.D.N.Y.
1989).
II Smith v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 651 F. Supp. 214, 216 (S.D. Tex. 1986).
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ism and outdated notions of femininity.3 23 Women con-
tinue to challenge the employers' ability to require or
pressure them to wear makeup, certain hairstyles, and cer-
tain uniforms or styles of clothing. The ticket agent, Te-
resa Fischette, claims that "Continental should not be
mixing their perception of attractiveness with profession-
alism. 324 Continental, conversely, says that its policy of
requiring female employees to wear makeup is part of the
airline's larger effort to improve its image. 25
2. Historic Protection of Grooming Standards
Most courts have held that grooming is not protected
under Title VII because it is an employer's prerogative to
set grooming guidelines.32 6 For example, the courts have
stated that, although Title VII's purpose is to protect
equal employment opportunities on the basis of funda-
mental rights and immutable characteristics, its purpose is
not to interfere with an employer's judgment on the man-
ner to conduct business. 27 Courts have held that Title
VII was not intended to interfere with appearance re-
quirements.328 For example, the Eighth Circuit, in Knott
v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. held that the primary thrust
of Title VII was to "discard outmoded sex stereotypes
posing distinct employment disadvantages for one
sex." 329 The court said that the legislative history of the
Act clearly illustrated that intent to provide equal employ-
ment opportunity for both sexes. 330 The House Report
33 John E. Peterson, Women Say Job Dress Codes, Makeup Policies Discriminate, GAN-




-12 Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publishing Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1091 (5th Cir.
1974); Rogers v. American Airlines, 527 F. Supp. 229, 231 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Cox
v. Delta Airlines, Inc., EMPL. PRAC. GUIDE (CCH) 7601 (EEOC 1976), aff'd, 553
F.2d 99 (5th Cir. 1977).
: 27 IVillingham, 507 F.2d at 1091.
32 Knott v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 527 F.2d 1249, 1252 (8th Cir. 1975); Craft
v. Metromedia, Inc., 572 F. Supp. 868, 877 (W.D. Mo. 1983).
32 Knott, 527 F.2d at 1251.
Id. at 1251 (citing H.R. REP. No. 92-238 supra note 44, at 2140-41).
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discussing the legislation states:
Women are subject to economic deprivation as a class.
Their self-fulfillment and development is frustrated be-
cause of their sex. Numerous studies have shown that wo-
men are placed in the less challenging, the less
responsible and the less remunerative positions on the ba-
sis of their sex alone. This Committee believes that wo-
men's rights are not judicial divertissements.
Discrimination against women is no less serious than other
forms of prohibited employment practices and is to be ac-
corded the same degree of social concern given to any
type of unlawful discrimination. The time has come to
bring an end to job discrimination once and for all and to
insure every citizen the opportunity for the decent self-re-
spect that accompanies a job commensurate with one's
abilities. 3 '
The court also found that the Act was never intended to
interfere with the personal appearance regulations that
employers chose to enforce. 32 Thus, the court reasoned
that a policy regarding hair length that applied to men but
not to women was not discriminatory.33 The court found
that the policy was part of a comprehensive personal
grooming code which applied to all employees. 34 Where
the policies were reasonable and imposed on all employ-
ees in an even-handed manner, the court found that slight
differences in the standards for men and women have only
a negligible effect on opportunities for employment.3 5
As such, grooming requirements, even if they differed for
men and women, remained within the employer's prerog-
ative and did not rise to the level of preventing the equal
opportunity that Congress addressed.
." Id. at 1252 n.2 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 92-238 supra note 44, at 2140-41).
"3 Knott, 527 F.2d at 1251-52. The legislative history makes clear that the legis-
lation was to discard outmoded sex stereotypes which created disadvantages in
employment but do not interfere in "'personal appearance regulations by private
employers." Id.
-3s Id. at 1252.
.,14 Id.
.11, Id. "While no hair length restriction is applicable to females, all employees
must conform to certain standards of dress." Id.
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The court for the Ninth Circuit in Baker v. California
Land Title Co. 336 used a similar line of reasoning in its deci-
sion to uphold different standards of hair length for men
and women. 3 " The court held that the intent of Title VII
was to eliminate discrimination on the basis of immutable
characteristics such as race, sex, and national origin, not
personal modes of dress or cosmetic effects.3 3 8 The ob-
jective of Congress, the court found, was to overcome
barriers that operated to discriminate against identifiable
groups. 339  Relying on the Supreme Court's analysis in
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., the court held that hair styles and
styles of dress were characteristics over which an em-
ployee had complete control.3 40 As such, these character-
istics did not rise to the level of identifying characteristics
protected under Title VII or to the level of characteristics
an individual could not alter. 4'
Because the court found that the requirements fell
under grooming standards, which were strictly under the
control of an employer, the court did not proceed to argu-
ments that such dress requirements could be justified as
BFO Qs. 42 In fact, no court could reach such analysis un-
less it finds that the grooming requirements do rise to the
level of characteristics which are protected under Title
VII. As long as the courts find that grooming is not pro-
tected, neither party will get to argue whether grooming
is a BFOQfor particularjobs. Therefore, we do not have
a study of whether such matters of appearance are bona
fide occupational qualifications for certain jobs.
' 507 F.2d 895 (9th Cir. 1974).
. Id. at 898. "We agree with the district court that a private employer may
require male employees to adhere to different modes of dress and grooming than
those required of female employees and such does not constitute an unfair em-
ployment practice within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a)." Id.
,"' Id. at 897.
-39 Id.
340 Id.
:4 507 F.2d at 897. "Obviously, it seems to us, the Court was not talking in
terms of hair styles or modes of dress over which the job applicant has complete
control. The Court was addressing itself to characteristics which the applicant,
otherwise qualified, had no power to alter." Id.
:142 Id.
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Thus, the cases have held that there may be different
standards for male and female grooming requirements.34 3
The main reason for such holdings is that grooming is a
mutable characteristic. In perhaps the strongest state-
ment of the employer's right to enforce certain grooming
standards, the court for the D.C. Circuit in Fagan v. Na-
tional Cash Register Co. 3 44 stated:
Perhaps no facet of business life is more important than a
company's place in public estimation. That the image cre-
ated by its employees dealing with the public when on
company assignment affects its relations is so well known
that we may take judicial notice of an employer's proper
desire to achieve favorable acceptance. Good grooming
regulations reflect a company's policy in our highly com-
petitive business environment. Reasonable requirements
in furtherance of that policy are an aspect of managerial
responsibility.345
The court for the D.C. Circuit in Fagan, in a challenge
to a policy enforcing different hair length standards for
men and women, held that such a policy was not discrimi-
natory. 46 The Fagan court said that the employer re-
quired the plaintiff to conform to standards which the
employer felt were necessary for his business.347 An em-
ployer, under this decision, has the right to define those
standards. That the employer expected differences in
male and female grooming is not indicative of any sexual
discrimination. 48 Such differences are based on mutable
characteristics and reflect our society's perception of the
gender differences in appropriate appearance in the busi-
ness world.
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Carroll v.
341 Id. at 898.
- 481 F.2d 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
141 Id. at 1124-25.
1I4 Id. at 1125-26. "[Olne seeking an employment opportunity as in our situa-
tion where hair length readily can be changed, may be required to conform to
reasonable grooming standards designed to further the employing company's in-
terest by which that very opportunity is provided." Id.
:1 Id. at 1124.
148 Id.
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Talman Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n of Chicago said that it
too was reluctant to determine whether personal appear-
ance requirements were "reasonable" but "[s]o long as
they find some justification in commonly accepted social
norms and are reasonably related to the employer's busi-
ness needs, such regulations are not necessarily viola-
tions of Title VII even though the standards prescribed
differ somewhat for men and women." '349 In sum, em-
ployers, like employees, have rights.3 50
Some court decisions have classified weight restrictions
as grooming requirements in order to leave them under
the airlines' control. 5 ' In those cases, the courts have in
essence held that requiring certain weights is the same as
requiring certain lengths of hair or certain types of
clothes. The airlines have continued to argue that they
should have control over such grooming standards of em-
ployees because the employees represent the airline to its
customers every day.
Conversely, critics oppose placing weight restrictions
under grooming requirements. The critics argue that
weight is not a mutable characteristic in the same way that
hair length is. They argue that it is much easier to get a
hair cut than to change one's weight.3 52 These critics use
two theories to support their contention that weight
should not be considered a mutable characteristic. First,
weight is predetermined, and second, it cannot possibly
be analyzed in the same way as the grooming require-
.'1 Carroll v. Talman Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n of Chicago, 604 F.2d 1028, 1032(7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 929 (1980).
'o Fagan, 481 F.2d at 1124.
.' See In re National Airlines, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 269, 275 (S.D. Fla. 1977)(weight program is not arbitrary but the owners informed judgment on how to
run a business);Jarrell v. Eastern Airlines, 430 F. Supp. 884, 891 (E.D. Va. 1977)(weight is part of personal appearance program), aff'd, 577 F.2d 869 (4th Cir.
1978); Cox v. Delta Airlines, Inc., EMP. PRAC. GUIDE (CCH) 7601 (EEOC
1976)(weight standards are part of grooming), afftd, 553 F.2d 99 (5th Cir. 1977).
But see Gerdom v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 692 F.2d 602, 605-06 (9th Cir. 1982)(weight standards are not the same as other "grooming" requirements because
there is a greater burden of compliance on females), cert. dismissed, 460 U.S. 1094
(1983).
15" Whitesides, supra note 13, at 218.
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ments 53 Nevertheless, courts have allowed weight poli-
cies under the category of grooming requirements.
The courts have also allowed employers to enforce cer-
tain dress codes and standards because grooming require-
ments do not violate Title VII. 54 Title VII protects
employees only from policies that distinguish between the
sexes on the basis of immutable characteristics or funda-
mental rights. 55 The courts have held that grooming re-
quirements or dress codes are neither immutable
characteristics nor fundamental rights; therefore, employ-
ers can regulate these aspects of an employee's appear-
ance. The business function is critical in this power of the
employer. 5 6 Thus, an employer may regulate such fea-
tures that it considers necessary to a business or that
maintain some sort of social norm.
3. Contrasting Grooming and Appearance
An important contrast to make in the analysis of al-
lowing different grooming standards for men and women
is that grooming is mutable while appearance, as an in-
trinsic part of an individual, is immutable. 57 Although
grooming can certainly influence appearance, employees
such as flight attendants complain that the appearance
standards that their employers enforce include some clas-
sic ideal or definition of beauty which only certain women
fit. 358
Nevertheless, employers claim the absolute right to es-
tablish grooming standards for employees. 35 9 They do
-1-1. Fear of Fat: The Medical Evidence, CONSUMER REPORTS, Aug. 1985, at 455. The
fat-cell theory says that a childhood diet high in calories leads the body to produce
excess fat cells which remain with a person for life. The set-point theory says that
each person's body is "programmed" to be a certain weight. The body will de-
fend itself against attempts to change that programmed weight. Id.
.r, Il'illingham, 507 F.2d at 1091-92.
355 Id.
:11,, Craft v. Metromedia, Inc., 572 F. Supp. at 877-78 (W.D. Mo. 1983); Fagan,
481 F.2d at 1124-25.
:157 See Bayer, supra note 152, at 837-39.
:15,1 See Whitesides, supra note 13, at 210.
39 Id. at 176.
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not distinguish between grooming and appearance. 60
The airlines claim the right to present a professional im-
age of the company to customers. As long as grooming
standards do not adversely affect one sex over another,
the airlines maintain that they are fair and should be up-
held. The airlines' arguments do not differ on the basis of
mutable or immutable characteristics. 3 6'
There is some debate over what should actually be con-
sidered a mutable characteristic, which is not protected by
Title VII. The courts have continued to protect charac-
teristics they define as "mutable" including hair length,
weight limits, and dress codes.362 Critics argue that these
distinctions between mutable and immutable characteris-
tics are arbitrary and meaningless because Title VII's defi-
nition of discrimination includes any distinction based on
sex. 363 These distinctions are prohibited because "Title
VII was enacted not simply to follow, but to lead in the
fight against arbitrary employment discrimination. 364
Under this analysis, the critics claim that the courts should
respect the individual integrity of the plaintiff and his or
her personality and choices. 65
It is important in this discussion to distinguish groom-
ing requirements from appearance. A different cause of
action arises when individuals claim they were not hired
because of their appearance rather than their grooming
habits. For example, discrimination based on appearance
typical of certain races is not permitted. The EEOC has
ruled that discrimination based on traditional racial char-
acteristics is illegal. 66 Where an employer made notes
that the applicant, an African American, had "unattrac-
tive, large lips" and rejected the candidate, the EEOC
mw Id. at 212.
361 Id.
:162 See Bayer, supra note 152 at 837-39.
63 Id. at 838.
364 Id. at 856.
I:;11 d. at 858 (arguing that choices an individual makes are valuable and have
much more than a negligible relation to the purpose of Title VII).
:,,;; EEOC Dec. No. 70-90, EMp. PRAC. GUIDE 6065 (CCH 1969).
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found that a substantial factor in her rejection was a racial
characteristic. 3 67 The EEOC therefore found reasonable
cause to believe that the employer was guilty of discrimi-
nation based on race.3 68
New recommendations for hiring practices provide that
employers should not request photographs of a job appli-
cant, nor should they ask questions regarding appearance
on job applications.3 69 The recommendations say that
employers should not require applicants to give physical
descriptions or submit pictures. Questions regarding
color of skin, eyes, and hair may reveal ethnic characteris-
tics that cannot be used in making employment deci-
sions.3 70 These recommendations hint that employers
have recognized, at least in the case of race, that charac-
teristics affecting appearance are immutable and could be
a basis of discrimination under Title VII. As suits con-
tinue against employers who require certain appearance
standards, perhaps this delineation between mutable and
immutable characteristics will develop and expand into a
basis for serious consideration in the Title VII context.
4. Appearance as a Handicap
Other studies and commentators take a completely dif-
ferent stance to challenge appearance requirements.
They argue that appearance, in some cases, should be
considered a handicap. 7' Supporters of this view claim
that immutable characteristics of a person which make
him or her "unattractive" in the accepted sense should
qualify as handicaps for the same reasons that certain
physical or mental impairments qualify. 2
Proponents of such a classification claim that the most
367 Id.
341 Id.369 45A AM. JUR. 2D job Discrimination § 461 (1986).
:70 Id.
:17 1 Note, Facial Discimination: Extending Handicap Law to Employment Discrimination
on the Basis of Physical Appearance, 100 HARV. L. REV. 2035, (1987) [hereinafter Fa-
cial Discrimination].
:7' Id. at 2044-45.
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physically unattractive people face extreme discrimina-
tion.37 " They also argue that "appearance, like race and
gender, is almost always an illegitimate employment crite-
rion, and ... it is frequently used to make decisions based
on personal dislike or prejudicial assumptions rather than
actual merit. '3 74 The argument for the inclusion of
''unattractive" appearance in the handicapped category is
that the physically unattractive face the same types of bur-
dens as handicapped people, minority groups, and other
protected classes. 75 Physical appearance is an especially
important part of employee selection, regardless of the
type of job or the relevance of appearance to the job.376
Although there have not been any direct challenges to
appearance discrimination, some cases present close ar-
guments. For example, the EEOC case involving the ap-
plicant not hired because of her "unattractive, large lips"
was held to be racial discrimination. 77 Therefore, the
EEOC did not directly address appearance as a handicap.
It merely held that racial appearance may not be used as a
discriminatory guideline for hiring.3 Weight challenges
have also been litigated, but those challenges were based
not on appearance discrimination but instead on the argu-
ment that weight should be viewed as a handicap under
handicap discrimination law.37 9 The courts have left open
the question if indeed obesity is a handicap under the
meaning of handicap legislation. Parties challenging ap-
pearance standards based on the handicapped argument
would utilize the Rehabilitation Act.
The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 prohibits discrimination
on the basis of physical handicaps. 8 ° If the courts find,
"7: Id. at 2035.
174 Id.
375 Id. at 2037.
:176 Id. at 2040.
377 EEOC Dec. No. 70-90, supra note 366, at 6065.
378 Id.
:171, See supra notes 218-36 and accompanying text.
-18o 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (Supp. 1992); Facial Discimination, supra note 371, at
2043. The handicapped category includes a person with a physical or mental im-
pairment which substantially limits one or more of such person's major life activi-
HIRING POLICY PROBLEMS
according to the definition of "handicapped" under the
Rehabilitation Act, that appearance is an impairment or
that a person is regarded by others as having an impair-
ment because of his or her appearance, then the act would
only slightly extend the Department of Health and
Human Services regulations, 8' which define handicaps as
including appearance-related factors such as cosmetic dis-
figurement, anatomical loss, and disfiguring scars. 82
Critics argue that there should be no distinction between
a facial scar and a jutting chin or extremely large nose. 83
An important element of the analysis is the part of the
statute which includes as a handicap category, people who
are "regarded as having an impairment." This subjective
standard seems helpful in light of the evidence that peo-
ple are judged by their appearance and that people are
subjected to prejudice due to their appearance. 84
Under the Rehabilitation Act, the individual would have
to show a substantial limitation in one or more life activi-
ties. An inability to find work is certainly a substantial lim-
itation. In addition, the ability to find some different kind
of work does not invalidate a claim. The court in E.E.
Black, Ltd. v. Marshall found that a handicapped person
who was unable to find work in his chosen field was sub-
stantially limited.3 85 That court stressed the need to ex-
amine and focus on the impaired person as an individual,
not just the impairment. 86
Of course, the real problem is deciding which jobs are
covered under the Act. In particular, the airlines will
ties, a person who has a record of such impairment, and a person who is regarded
as having such an impairment. 29 U.S.C. § 7 94(a). Therefore, there is a two-step
test to prove a handicapped status. First, a claimant must show that he or she has
an impairment or is regarded as having an impairment, and second, that the im-
pairment substantially limits life activities.
11- 45 C.F.R. § 84-3(j)(2)(i) (1985).
:1"'- Facial Discrimination, supra note 371, at 2044.
3" Id. at 2045.
194 Id.
", 497 F. Supp. 1088, 1099 (D. Haw. 1980).
.'8 Id. The court rejected tests such as requiring the plaintiff to show that he
was precluded from many or most jobs and requiring the plaintiff to show that his
impairment would affect employability in general. Id.
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probably continue to use their arguments that an em-
ployer has the right to maintain certain grooming stan-
dards, including appearance tests. Other employers who
require a "front desk appearance" will have similar argu-
ments. For example, the employers of receptionists,
salespeople, and others who deal with the public and rep-
resent the employer to the public will probably argue that
a certain type of appearance is a BFOQ for the position.
One possible test "is whether a handicapped individual
who meets all employment criteria except for the chal-
lenged discriminatory criterion 'can perform the essential
functions of the position in question without endangering
the health and safety of the individuals or others.' "387
Another form of analysis is to utilize the earlier arguments
of Diaz and Wilson which require a BFOQ to be a business
necessity, not merely a business convenience. 38 8 Because
the primary function of the airlines is to provide safe, effi-
cient service, employees could argue that other attributes
are merely tangential. 89 Similarly, employees could ar-
gue that a receptionist receives customers or clients and
appearance does not affect the ability to answer phones or
direct customers.
Proof, of course, will be the most difficult aspect of us-
ing appearance as a handicap. "Handicapped" is not an
absolute definition or classification like race, sex, religion,
and national origin. Instead, "handicapped" is a label im-
posed by society. The "normal" majority draws the line
between "normal" and "handicapped. ' 390 A dictionary
definition of handicapped is not a complete description
because social judgment is a crucial factor in the mix. 39'
I'l Prewitt v. United States Postal Service, 662 F.2d 292, 307 (5th Cir. 1981)
(quoting 28 C.F.R. §§ 1613.702(f)-.703).
"' See supra notes 50-64 and accompanying text..
"" Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 388 (5th Cir. 1971).
Marcia P. Burgdorf & Robert Burgdorf, Jr., A History of Unequal Treatment:
The Qualifications of Handicapped Persons as a "Suspect Class" Under the Equal Protection
Clause, 15 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 855, 858 (1975). The authors argue that such
social judgment is discriminatory and that the handicapped should be afforded
equal protection under the 14th Amendment. Id. at 899.
-," Id. at 857.
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Of course, the employer will always have the opportunity
to say that it made hiring decisions based on other rea-
sons. It will always be up to the plaintiff, who is generally
the party with the least amount of information about the
decision, to show the discriminatory reasons. Cases will
be easiest to prove where there are "smoking guns" such
as interview reports and evaluation sheets.392 The fact
that physical appearance is a significant factor in em-
ployee selection will continue to make the appearance
controversy a debated issue. 93
E. SEXUAL LIFESTYLE
A final area in which the courts have not found sex dis-
crimination is in the area of sexual lifestyle. The couits
have held that sexual lifestyles, proclivities, and practices
are not protected under Title VII. "Nonconforming" sex-
ual lifestyles were not considered when Title VII was
enacted. 9 4
Homosexuals, bisexuals, and transsexuals who have un-
dergone sexual reassignment surgery are not pro-
tected. 95 In Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., the Seventh
Circuit held that transsexuality was not protected under
Title VII.39 6 Karen Ulane, formerly Kenneth Ulane, sued
Eastern for its termination and refusal to reinstate her to
flight status after gender reassignment surgery. The
court held that Title VII did not protect transsexuals be-
cause the prohibition of discrimination based on "sex"
was not synonymous with "sexual preference" or "sexual
identity. 397
The meaning of "sex" was given its common and ordi-
nary meaning?98 Discrimination based on sex means dis-
criminating against women because they are women or
Facial Discrimination, supra note 371, at 2047.
I,' Id.
39' EEOC Dec. No. 76-67, EMPL. PRAC. GUIDE (CCH) 6493 (EEOC 1976).
-,115 742 F.2d 1081, 1087 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1017 (1984).
3911 Id. at 1084.
:,!1 Id. at 1084-85.
:98 Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979).
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men because they are men. It does not encompass a
broader meaning. The court reinforced its decision by
showing congressional attempts to amend Title VII to
prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation. 99
All of these attempts failed; therefore, the court said that
these checked efforts indicated that discrimination based
on sex should be viewed in the traditional and narrow
sense.40 0 The plaintiff would have stated a claim only if
she had shown that the airline considered her as a female
and discriminated against her on that basis.
V. ANALYSIS
A. TITLE VII ARGUMENTS FOR CHANGE
The Supreme Court has denounced persistent stere-
otyping of females.40 ' Such a statement could have strong
implications on the hiring practices of the airlines. For
example, critics of airline hiring standards argue that the
policies are based particularly on the male stereotype of
the "ideal woman." These stereotypes include weight
limitations and appearance ideals. Employers argue that
they have the right to set certain guidelines for
employees.
The Supreme Court has stated that there must be a bal-
ance between employee rights and employer preroga-
tives.40 2 The Court made that statement in the context of
a sex discrimination suit brought by a woman who was not
199 Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1085 n.11. See, e.g., H.R. 166, 94th Cong., ist Sess.
(1975); H.R. 2667, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); H.R. 5452, 94th Cong., Ist Sess.
(1975); H.R. 451, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. (1977); H.R. 775, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1977); H.R. 2998, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); H.R. 4794, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1977); H.R. 5239, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); H.R. 8268, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1977); H.R. 8269, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); H.R. 2074, 96th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1980); H.R. 1454, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
400 Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1084.
41'1 See supra notes 181-182 and accompanying text.
102 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 242 (1989). Although the pur-
pose of Title VII is to protect the rights of the employee, the statute is also
designed to protect the employer's remaining freedom of choice. Thus, the em-
ployer is not liable if, even if it had not taken gender into account, it would have
reached the same decision regarding a prospective employee. Id.
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made a partner in an accounting firm. The plaintiff in
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins was not made a partner the first
year she was considered, and then the partners refused to
bring her up for reconsideration in subsequent years.
The plaintiff was apparently competent and successful,
but her aggressiveness was viewed as abrasive by some of
her co-workers. The partners characterized her as
"macho", overcompensating "for being a woman," and
needing to take "a course at charm school. '" ° 3 In the pol-
icy board's advice to the plaintiff to improve her chances
for making partner, the review advised that she should
"walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more
femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear
jewelry. ' '4 0 The plaintiff charged that based on this evi-
dence, she was the victim of sex discrimination that is for-
bidden under Title VII.
The Supreme Court held that employers may not use
gender in a decision, and employers have the burden of
proof in any challenge. 0 5 To say that an employer may
not use gender as a basis for decisions, however, does not
end the analysis. The employer still has the remaining
freedom of choice protected by the statute.0 6 The Court
held that this protection means that the employer has the
opportunity to show that the decision was not based solely
on the gender reasons, but that it would have made the
same decision even if it had not used gender.0 7 In the
Civil Rights Act of 1991,408 however, Congress directly
overruled the Price Waterhouse holding and classified as dis-
criminatory any use of gender as a hiring factor.40 9
The rationale for the holding in Price Waterhouse as well
as the new legislation is based on the original intent of
Title VII. That intent, according to the comanagers of Ti-
403 Id. at 235.
404 Id.
" Id. at 239.
4mi Id. at 242.
407 Id.
'.$ Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (Supp. 1991).
109 See ifra notes 429-32 and accompanying text.
1992] 333
334 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE [58
tie VII, is to have employers focus on the qualifications of
an employee rather than a protected category of sex, reli-
gion, race, or national origin.410 The comanagers stated
that:
To discriminate is to make a distinction, to make a differ-
ence in treatment or favor, and those distinctions or differ-
ences in treatment or favor which are prohibited by
section 703 are those which are based on any five of the
forbidden criteria: race, color, religion, sex, and national
origin. Any other criterion or qualification for employ-
ment is not affected by this title.41
Therefore, while employers are not permitted to take gen-
der into account for the basis of an employment decision,
they are still free to decide against a person of a certain
sex based on other reasons. An actual focus on qualifica-
tions of an employee rather than stereotyped characteris-
tics based on sex could solve the airline hiring problems.
As flight attendants have contended for years, weight and
appearance may not be determinative of a person's ability
to serve refreshments and assist passengers in an
emergency.
An employer's decision to act on the belief that a wo-
man cannot be aggressive or that as a woman she should
not be aggressive is based on sex stereotyping. 41 2 Such
stereotyping violates Title VII.4 13 An employer cannot
make employment decisions based strictly on stereotyped
impressions about the difference in male and female char-
acteristics. 41 4 Moreover, its decision cannot be based
even in part on sex stereotyping. The courts have dis-
cussed and warned parties about the harmful effects of us-
ing occupational cliches. 415  The fact that certain
-," Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 243. "The intent to drive employers to focus on
qualifications rather than on race, religion, sex, or national origin is the theme of a
good deal of the statute's legislative history." Id.
" 110 CONG. REC. 7213 (1964).
412 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 250.
4 1: Id.; Los Angeles v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978).
M Vanhart, 435 U.S. at 707.
115 Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725 (1982); Gerdom
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appearance requirements for flight attendants still exist
hints that some stereotyping is prevalent in the airline in-
dustry. There is still an attitude that women should look a
certain way. The problem with challenging this attitude
under Title VII is that the airlines apply the same or simi-
lar requirements to male flight attendants. Perhaps the
Supreme Court's statements about stereotyping, new leg-
islation, and the pervasive opposition to the standards by
employees signal a slow willingness to modify hiring prac-
tices of the airlines.
B. CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1991
Congress has recognized that difficulties remain for
challengers under Title VII. In fact, the Civil Rights Act
of 1991 addressed several areas in which the Supreme
Court retracted protection of employees under Title
VII.41 6 Congress found that the 1991 legislation was nec-
essary to provide additional protection against employ-
ment discrimination and to overrule court decisions that
weakened both the scope and effectiveness of civil rights
laws.41 7 The purposes of the Act included providing ap-
propriate remedies, codifying the concept of "business
necessity," confirming guidelines for suits based on dispa-
rate impact, and providing adequate protection for em-
ployees against discrimination.4 I8
v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 692 F.2d 602, 607 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. dismissed, 460
U.S. 1074 (1983).
'" Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (Supp. 1991).
137 CONG. REc. S15,482 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991) (statement of Sen. Robert
Dole).
I'l Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 3, 105 Stat. at 1071. The purposes of this Act
are:
(1) to provide appropriate remedies for intentional discrimination
and unlawful harassment in the workplace; (2) to codify the concepts
of "business necessity" and "job related" enunciated by the
Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971),
and in other Supreme Court decisions prior to Wards Cove Packing
Co. v. Antonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989); (3) to confirm statutory author-
ity and provide statutory guidelines for the adjudication of disparate
impact suits under title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C.
2000e et seq.); and (4) to respond to recent decisions of the
Supreme Court by expanding the scope of relevant civil rights stat-
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In signing the Civil Rights Act of 1991, President Bush
stated that one of the most crucial areas of the Act re-
solved controversies involving the law of disparate im-
pact, but not in a way to encourage quotas or unfair
preferences in hiring.4t 9 In fact, the Act was instrumental
in clarifying the law in the area of disparate impact. The
Act overruled the Supreme Court's 1989 decision in
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio.420 In Wards Cove, the
Supreme Court placed the burden to show that hiring
practices were not business necessities on employees
claiming job discrimination.42' This holding contradicted
the rule stated in the Court's 1971 decision in Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., where the employer had the burden to
show that a challenged hiring policy was in fact a business
necessity. 4
2 2
Subsection 703(k)(1) is intended to overrule the Wards
Cove decision and restore the rule stated in Griggs.423
Thus, an employer's showing of business necessity will
again function as an affirmative defense to a claim of dis-
crimination. The provision of the Act will probably not
have a significant effect on the outcome of any challenges
by flight attendants because the Act simply returns to the
rule used in most of the challenges based on disparate im-
pact. Continuing to use the Wards Cove rule, however,
utes in order to provide adequate protection to victims of
discrimination.ld.
411) Statement of President Bush Upon Signing S. 1745, 27 WEEKLY COMP. PRES.
Doc. 1701 (Nov. 25, 1991).
42o 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
421 Id.
422 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
42., H.R. REP. No. 102-40(11), 102d Cong., 1st Sess., at 6 (1991). Subsection
703(k)(1)(A) provides:
An unlawful employment practice based on disparate impact is es-
tablished under this title only if (i) a complaining party demonstrates
that a respondent uses a particular employment practice that causes
a disparate impact on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or na-
tional origin and the respondent fails to demonstrate that the chal-
lenged practice is job related for the position in question and
consistent with business necessity ....
Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 105, 105 Stat. at 1974.
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could have negatively affected challenges by placing an
additional burden on the employees claiming
discrimination.
The House Report on the 1991 Act states that the prac-
tical reasons for placing the burden of proving a business
necessity on the employer are obvious.424 Those reasons
include the employer having control over the employment
and hiring practices and having information about the
costs and benefits of using such practices.42 5 One final
provision in Subsection 703(k)(1) which could be of some
help to the flight attendants' claims is the codification of
the "lesser discriminatory alternative" doctrine.426 This
doctrine provides that if a defendant shows that a practice
is a business necessity, the plaintiff can still prevail by
showing that other practices with less disparate impact
would serve equally well. 427 This doctrine was announced
by the Supreme Court in the 1975 decision Albemarle Paper
Co. v. Moody.428
A second important change in the Act is the codification
of the rule that any reliance on prejudice in making em-
ployment decisions is illegal.4 29 This rule was codified in
response to the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse
v. Hopkins that an employment decision made in part for a
discriminatory reason does not violate Title VII if the em-
ployer would have made the same decision based on non-
424 H.R. REP. No. 102-40(11), supra note 423, at 12.
425 Id.
426 Id. at 26.
427 Id.
42s 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975). The Court held that: "If an employer does then
meet the burden of proving that its tests are 'job-related' it remains open to the
complaining party to show that other tests or selection devices, without a similarly
undesirable racial effect, would also serve the employer's legitimate interest in
'efficient and trustworthy workmanship.' " Id. Thus, Subsection 703(k)(1) shows
that there is a three stage process to prove disparate impact. First, the plaintiff
has the burden to show the discriminatory impact of an employment practice.
Second, the defendant must demonstrate that the practice is required by business
necessity. Finally, if the defendant meets that burden, the plaintiff may still show
that other practices have less disparate impact.
4,1, H.R. REP. No. 102-40(11), supra note 421, at 4.
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discriminatory reasons.43 0 The new subsection 703(1)
provides that an unlawful employment practice is estab-
lished when an employer uses sex, race, color, religion, or
national origin as a contributing factor for any employ-
ment practice, even though additional factors also con-
tribute to the practice.43' Congress felt that the Price
Waterhouse decision undercut the prohibitions of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 and responded by rejecting the
Supreme Court's analysis of the issue.43 2 Thus, to estab-
lish liability under the Act, a claimant must show that dis-
crimination was a contributing factor in an employment
policy or decision. This clarification could be somewhat
helpful in flight attendant claims in that it makes claims of
discrimination easier to prove than under the Price
Waterhouse formulation.
A final aspect of the 1991 Act which could affect the
flight attendant suits is the codification of certain rules af-
fecting consent decrees. Such rules could be very impor-
tant to flight attendants considering the growth in the
number of suits culminating in consent decrees. The new
subsection overrules the Supreme Court's decision in
Martin v. Wilks.433 In Martin, the Court held that Title VII
did not bar parties who failed to intervene in a discrimina-
tion suit ending in a consent decree from challenging de-
cisions made pursuant to that decree.434 The Court
noted, however, that Congress had the power to create
special remedial schemes to foreclose successive
litigation.43 5
1, Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 242.
43, Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 107, 105 Stat. at 1075. Section 703 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e-2) (as amended by sections 105 and 106) is
further amended by adding at the end the following new subsection: "(m) Except
as otherwise provided in this title, an unlawful employment practice is established
when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or na-
tional origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though
other factors also motivated the practice." Id.
11 H.R. REP. No. 102-40(11), supra note 423, at 4.
133 490 U.S. 755 (1989).
#34 Id. at 761-62.
1:15 Id. at 762 n.2.
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That power is precisely the one Congress exercised in
the new subsection 703(n) which precludes challenges on
constitutional or civil rights grounds to employment prac-
tices in the scope of a consent judgment or order resolv-
ing a claim of discrimination.436 Litigants are prohibited
from challenging these decrees if they had actual notice, a
reasonable opportunity to present objection to the judg-
ment, or interests which were adequately represented by
the previous challenge.43 7 Therefore, while Congress
stated that its goal was to expand protection from employ-
ment discrimination, it also made clear that it was empha-
sizing the effect of consent decrees and judgments on
later challenges. Such a statement could possibly pre-
clude repeated challenges by flight attendants on heavily
contested policies such as weight standards.
C. LIMITATIONS OF TITLE VII
Thus, even with the new civil rights legislation, it is not
clear that Title VII can adequately address all of the con-
cerns of flight attendants about hiring standards. Most re-
cent challenges have been unsuccessful in arguing that
hiring practices are discriminatory under Title VII. How-
ever, there has been an increased focus on discriminatory
1- Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 108, 105 Stat. at 1075.
437 Id.
(n)(1)(B) A practice described in subparagraph (A) may not be chal-
lenged in a claim under the Constitution or federal civil rights
laws-
(i) by a person who, prior to the entry of the judgment or order
described in subparagraph (A), had-
(I) actual notice of the proposed judgment or order suficient to
apprise such person that such judgment or order might adversely
affect the interests and legal rights of such person and that an oppor-
tunity was available to present objections to such judgment or order
by a future date certain; and
(II) a reasonable opportunity to present objections to such judg-
ment or order; and
(ii) by a person whose interests were adequately represented by an-
other person who had previously challenged the judgment or order
on the same legal grounds and with a similar factual situation, unless
there has been an intervening change in law or fact.
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practices as evidenced by the 1991 legislation. Clarifica-
tions in the burdens of proof, definitions, and other
changes may provide at least some advantage to
challengers.
The developing BFOQ analysis may also affect hiring
policies. The BFOQ analysis for Title VII and for ADEA
are intricately related and seem to be moving in the same
direction. This analysis includes the requirement that a
standard must relate to the essence of the job.4 38 There
also must be a factual basis for believing that a person
would be unable to perform the job.43 '9 Finally, it must be
impossible or impracticable to deal with members of the
excluded class on an individual basis.440 In the abstract,
these forms of analysis could give the airlines and the
flight attendants something to think about in their contin-
ued use of some of these hiring standards.
The flight attendants could argue, and have done so in
the past, that hiring standards based on weight, age, and
appearance are truly discriminatory in that they rely on
sexual stereotypes of women and have no relation to the
ability of any person to perform the duties of the job.
None of these forms of analysis will be helpful if the chal-
lenges are not truly challenges based on Title VII catego-
ries. Courts have managed to keep the challenges based
on age, weight, and appearance out of Title VII by classi-
fying them under other statutes and grooming standards.
In fact, using the traditional definitions of the courts, the
challenges based on age, weight, and appearance appear
to best fit under other forms of analysis.
For example, challenges to age fit best under the
ADEA. The only way that age challenges could fall under
Title VII is if an airline applies different age requirements
4:1, See Western Airlines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 416-17 (1985) (applying
the essence requirement to age discrimination under the ADEA); Diaz v. Pan
American World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 388 (5th Cir. 1971) (applying the
essence test in Title VII cases), cert. denied 404 U.S. 950 (1971).
4:11) Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 235-26 (5th Cir.
1969); EEOC Dec. No. 71-1103, EMPL. PRAC. GUIDE (CCH) 6203 (EEOC 1971).
411 Western Airlines, 472 U.S. at 416-17.
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to males and females. The airlines litigated and lost this
type of discrimination suit. Current age discrimination is
hard to prove and is not truly protected for employees
under forty, as required by the ADEA. Pressure from em-
ployees and unions, however, has caused some airline rec-
ognition and compromise. Age-related appearance,
however, is not protected under ADEA. Perhaps there
will be new challenges based on age-related appearance
as an immutable characteristic under Title VII. Such chal-
lenges will only occur, however, if there is airline resist-
ance to hiring policies or a perceived effort on the part of
the airlines to force early retirement through appearance
requirements or perhaps weight requirements. True pro-
gress in age discrimination challenges occurred under Ti-
tle VII and the sex-plus analysis. Airlines could not
require female flight attendants to be younger than males.
Weight challenges remain a problem for the flight at-
tendants because the courts are reluctant to recognize any
disparate treatment or disparate impact of these policies.
The cases that did recognize discriminatory treatment did
so because the weight standards were applied only to fe-
male flight attendants. With the increase in statistically
based weight standards and the increasing number of
court approved settlements in these big cases, there is a
decreasing basis for claims of discrimination. Moreover,
weight has continued to be protected in many cases under
grooming standards. Such a classification removes weight
standards totally from the Title VII analysis. Perhaps the
future in weight suits will be in the area of handicap dis-
crimination and in continuing arguments that weight
should not be classified as a grooming standard because it
is not a mutable characteristic. These arguments will de-
pend on medical evidence and theories on the body's abil-
ity to set certain weights and resist change. Appearance
challenges continue to be difficult because it is a very hard
category to define. Appearance will probably continue to
be lumped in with grooming rather than treated as the
separate standard it really is. Grooming requirements will
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probably continue to be protected as a long-standing tra-
dition and a tribute to the ability of the businessperson to
define acceptable standards that are reasonably necessary
to the operation of the business. However, the growing
trend may be to stress appearance as a distinct and immu-
table characteristic that should actually be classified as a
handicap.
Diversification in all of these categories has occurred
most likely from the gradual wearing down of the system
and the growing opposition to using flight attendants as
"sex objects" and "marketing tools". Flight attendants
are older because of the invalidation of mandatory retire-
ment rules based on age and the invalidation of the
mandatory retirement for married flight attendants.
There is a lower turnover rate in the field than in the
1970's, and the airlines have stopped considering the job
as temporary. The ADEA, of course, has increased atten-
tion on the hiring practices related to age.
In the area of weight standards and appearance require-
ments, there has certainly been a decrease in the use of
flight attendants as sexy marketing tools. Flight attend-
ants have gained more respect as professionals rather
than cocktail hostesses or sex objects. Although there is
still an appearance component in the airlines' focus on
grooming standards, the emphasis is certainly not the
same as the "Miss America" one formerly used. Weight
limits have continued to increase and become geared to
statistical data. The majority of the American population
would not meet the requirements of the airlines, but the
requirements have certainly become more reasonable
than they were in the strict 115 pound limit days.
Important factors in the changes between the parties
are the growing power of the employees through unions
and other groups and the cost of protracted litigation
brought by unions, employees, or the EEOC. Employee
relations are important to the airlines, and continued
good will is crucial to that relationship. Also, adverse
publicity is costly to the airlines and counteracts the ef-
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forts and millions of dollars in advertising budgets that
the companies spend each year in the increasingly com-
petitive market. The cost of litigation as well as the ad-
verse publicity generated make long cases prohibitive.
Airlines have become much more interested in settling
cases as the emphasis on arbitration and settlement has
grown. Although the flight attendants and the airlines
probably are resigned that they will never completely
agree on hiring practices and the role of the employees'
interests versus the role of the employers' businesses,
they have come to terms with the fact that they must work
together to minimize conflict over these issues.

